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INFORMATION NOTE ON THE ASIA-PACIFIC FORESTRY SECTOR OUTLOOK STUDY 
 
The Asia-Pacific Forestry Sector Outlook Study (APFSOS) is a wide-ranging initiative to gather 
information on, and examine, the evolution of key forestry issues as well as to review important trends 
in forests and forestry. The main purpose of the study is to provide a better understanding of the 
changing relationships between society and forests and thus to facilitate timely policy reviews and 
reforms in national forest sectors. The specific objectives are to: 
 
1. Identify emerging socio-economic changes impacting on forest and forestry 
2. Analyze probable scenarios for forestry developments to 2020 
3. Identify priorities and strategies to address emerging opportunities and challenges 
 
The first APFSOS was completed in 1998, with an outlook horizon to 2010. During its twenty-first 
session, held in Dehradun, India, in April 2006, the Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission (APFC) 
resolved to update the outlook extending the horizon to 2020. The study commenced in October 2006 
and is expected to be completed by September 2009. 
 
The study has been coordinated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), through its regional office in Bangkok and its headquarters in Rome, and implemented in close 
partnership with APFC member countries with support from a number of international and regional 
agencies. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Tropical Timber Organization 
(ITTO), and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) provided 
substantial financial support to implement the study. Partnerships with the Asia-Pacific Association of 
Forest Research Institutes (APAFRI) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) supported the 
organizing and implementing of national focal points’ workshops and other activities, which have been 
crucial to the success of this initiative. The contributions of many other individuals and institutions are 
gratefully acknowledged in the main APFSOS report.   
 
Working papers have been contributed or commissioned on a wide range of topics. These fall under the 
following categories: country profiles, sub-regional studies and thematic studies. Working papers have 
been prepared by individual authors or groups of authors and represent their personal views and 
perspectives; therefore, opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of their employers, the 
governments of the APFC member countries or of FAO. Material from these working papers has been 
extracted and combined with information from a wide range of additional sources to produce the main 
regional outlook report.  
 
Working papers are moderately edited for style and clarity and are formatted to provide a measure of 
uniformity, but otherwise remain the work of the authors. Copies of these working papers, as well as 
more information on the Asia-Pacific Forestry Sector Study, can be obtained from: 
 
Mr. Patrick Durst 
Senior Forestry Officer 
FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 
39 Phra Atit Road 
Bangkok 10200 
THAILAND 
Ph. (66-2) 697 4000 
Fax: (66-2) 697 4445 
Email: patrick.durst@fao.org  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The growing realization that the fate of forests will be determined by factors outside the 
forests and the forestry sector has prompted individuals and institutions to look beyond the 
immediate causes of forest health and degradation in order to unravel not-so-obvious and 
often difficult-to-establish links between macro-level variables and forest condition. Inspired 
by the same realization, this paper seeks to explore the links between macro-economic trends 
and forests in order to develop scenarios of the future macro-economic environment in the 
Asia-Pacific region and how this will likely affect forests and the forestry sector. 
 
This paper is a contribution to the Asia-Pacific Forestry Sector Outlook Study II (APFSOS II) 
that intends to assess the probable scenarios for forests and forestry to the year 2020. It is not 
an original research, as its bases its analysis largely on available data compiled by different 
institutions and agencies. It does not claim to be comprehensive in terms of scope as some 
countries, due to insufficiency and unavailability of data, may be excluded in the analysis, and 
some variables, due to lack of theoretical and empirical work previously done, may not be 
included in the exposition. Also, the paper has to contend with the variation and complexity 
of countries, and the rapid changes that occur in them. Largely, the approach in this paper is 
qualitative involving a careful application of judgment. 
 
Despite the heterogeneity of trajectories, the paper is certain in several things. Asia and the 
Pacific (and its countries) is the most economically dynamic region in the world, with China 
and India leading the future growth scenarios. Though industrialized countries in the region 
such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand seemed to have grown modestly over the past 
decade, growth rates and GDP per capita figures have been impressive in most economies, 
even in low income countries. This growth performance was also complemented by 
significant achievements in poverty reduction that made the region experience the sharpest 
decline in poverty when compared with other developing regions in the world. However, 
while growth proceeded with its consequent effects in reducing poverty, inequality in the 
region decreased neglibly. 
 
The growth of the region is accompanied with a gradual transformation of its economies. The 
shift from agriculture to service and industry as a generator of GDP is evident in most 
countries though most of the people still live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for 
livelihood. A few countries are largely industrialized and urbanized while the majority are 
either transforming (in transition from agriculture of other sectors) or agriculture-based. This 
categorization is important especially in gauging the type of impact economic growth will 
have on economies and forests.  
 
For urbanized countries (e.g. the industrialized and the newly-industrialized countries), 
economic growth may no longer pose significant risks to forests because the risks of 
converting land for agriculture are slim and reliance on natural resources for individual 
livelihoods is minimal. Also, demands for forest products can be satisfied externally, given 
the strength of the economies of these countries and the relative cost advantage associated 
with importation. However, the agriculture-based economies will experience a different path, 
as increased affluence may cause increases in consumption demand for food and forest 
products which may be met by agricultural expansion, further forest conversion and forest 
resource extraction. The dynamic external demand for forest products will also endanger 
forests further as the incentive to cut trees for timber will increase. In these contexts, forests 
too, serve as a social safety net when livelihood shocks occur. 
 
Nevertheless, the structural transformation of the economies – the movement from agriculture 
to industry or services – will positively impact on forests. However, this positive impact 
happens only when the transition happens totally (e.g. both labor and income moves away 
from the agricultural sector) and not partially (e.g. income moves away but labor largely 
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remains in the agricultural sector). As long as most people rely on agriculture for livelihood, 
there is always a risk that forest will be cleared to give way to farms. And as long as most 
people are poor, there is always a danger that forests will be used unsustainably, either as a 
safety net or as a means of livelihood. 
 
It is acknowledged that examining the link between macro-economic trends and forestry is a 
complicated and daunting task. Economic growth, as a variable for example, runs on a reverse 
causality problem with forests. At one end, economic growth may decrease pressures on 
forests by improving off-farm employment, but it may also stimulate more forest clearing to 
meet increasing demand for food and other necessities. Also, forest depletion can contribute 
to economic growth in some cases, while economic growth is necessary for increased 
investments in forestry in others. 
 
Also, macro-economic trends and policy instruments, those dealt with in this paper, do not 
have a direct and unassailable link with forests. The movement of interest rates, exchange 
rates, agricultural subsidies, tax incentives, agricultural prices, and wages has varied effects 
on forests and forestry depending on certain circumstances. For example, increases in 
domestic interest rates discourage investment in industries that involves land clearing or high 
forest resource requirements because domestic capital becomes increasingly expensive. This 
may be beneficial to forests but when it results in a halt in investments and a squeeze on 
domestic demand, this poses danger on forests as it may result in a significant closure of 
industrial players and redundant workers who may turn to agriculture and natural resources 
for livelihood.   
 
The same is true with the other variables analyzed. Increase in off-farm wages may attract 
labor from agriculture to other sectors, lessening agricultural intensification and forest 
clearing, but will also stimulate demand for food and forest products that promote greater 
investments in agriculture and encourage logging. Currency revaluation affects forests 
negatively, but so does currency depreciation. The grant of agricultural subsidies will promote 
agricultural expansion but its removal may also encourage increased deforestation. Thus, the 
links between economic variables and forests are present, but whether they are negative or 
positive, the analysis provides an inconclusive, and in some cases, ambiguous response. 
 
However, it is apparent that the behavior of agents in the economy is the ultimate driver in the 
changes in forests and forestry. These agents can be proximate to forests, and thus, their 
actions directly impinge on forest health and condition. But they too can be remote from 
forests, but their decisions, in the form of macro-economic policies, establish or change the 
whole context where all others in a particular economy act and react on. Also, echoing the 
World Bank’s argument, incentives and constraints are the deciding factors that influence the 
behavior of agents. These incentives and constraints, shaped also by agents, determine 
whether agents will maintain, grow, conserve, or clear forests.   
 
What is the region’s growth prospect and how will it affect forests in 2020? 
 
Economic growth is projected to continue in the short to medium term, largely driven by the 
dynamism of exports and the buoyancy of domestic demand. Though the US recession, the 
risk of which is gauged between 40 to 50%, poses a formidable threat to the region’s 
economies, this is believed to have lesser impacts on regional growth than what happened in 
2001. Several factors contribute to this optimism. Most countries in the region have high 
savings and investment ratios, larger official reserves, and stronger human capital base. Also, 
the region has shown rapid movement of labor and capital from low- to high-productivity 
sectors, high labor productivity, and more efficient macro-economic management. More 
importantly, domestic demand has continually remained buoyant in recent years so that global 
slowdown may be compensated by greater and freer regional trade. It has to be acknowledged 
however, that the effects of a potential recession may affect some countries more than others, 
APFSOS II: Macro-economic trends and their impacts on forests and forestry 
 6
depending on the size of the economies and their reliance on exports to sustain growth 
performance.  
 
As such, growth will proceed but at varying rates across countries, across regions and 
provinces, and across households. The variations in economic performance, achievements, 
and prospects are related to the differences in initial conditions, factor endowments, quality of 
institutions, and economic policies of countries. As such, inequality between and within 
countries will still persist throughout the outlook period and poverty will still be a significant 
problem, in both relative and absolute terms. Thus, in 2020, some countries may be able to 
achieve high growth rates without necessarily affecting significant changes in income 
distribution while others are capable of achieving both growth and lesser inequality conditions. 
Still, others may be faced by problems of low growth rates and widening inequality or have 
low growth rates but with considerable achievements in spreading growth benefits among 
their citizens. 
 
Under these growth scenarios, forests may be affected in different ways, depending on certain 
factors. First, the role of forests in a country’s economy is one of the persuasive factors that 
would determine its fate in the future. Some countries may use forests to chart their growth 
further while others may conserve them for environmental and social reasons. Some 
households too may regard forests as a way to escape poverty while others revere them for 
spiritual and aesthetic values. Still, other private agents will regard forests as a way to gain 
more profits without the intention of replenishment or conservation. Thus, how countries, 
companies, and households regard forests, in so far as their role in advancing economic 
affluence will determine their behavior towards them and consequently, determine the forests’ 
future.   
 
Second, with the increasing international prescriptions favoring investments in the rural 
countryside and in the revival of agriculture as a way to reduce poverty and inequality, forests 
may be at risk. Investments in agricultural expansion will heighten competition for land use 
that would pose significant threat to forests but on the other hand, will also move people away 
from relying on forests for livelihood. Capital infusion in the countryside may increase both 
alternative livelihood and agricultural expansion, the former beneficial, and the latter 
detrimental to forest condition. These efforts on improving rural conditions and enhancing 
agricultural productivity will most likely result in enhanced well-being of the rural poor. On 
the one hand, they may preclude them from further resource extraction, but on the other will 
encourage clearing more land for farms as well. The primary challenge here is to ensure that 
this process of making the rural countryside more visible and economically viable will not 
have significant repercussions on forests and environmental condition. 
 
Finally, driven by both internal and external pressures, countries will strive to improve living 
conditions through increased investments in education and health, better access to financial 
capital for the poor, and probably revitalization of rural economies. Also, they may strive to 
ensure that the benefits of economic growth will spread across regions and will help solve the 
country’s problems with inadequate labor absorption. Admittedly though, the achievements of 
different countries in this case will be variable, owing to differences in their political, 
economic, and socio-cultural base and the relative changes associated with increased 
globalization in trade, labor, and capital.   
 
Needless to say, the future of the region’s economy, as well as its forests, is determined by the 
decisions of the different agents within each country and in the region. The decisions made 
and implemented by individuals, households, local governments, non-governmental 
organizations, community associations, churches, national bureaucracies, and international 
organizations have myriad effects on the economic performance of countries, and on the 
health and status of their forests. These decisions, whether done on micro- or macro-scales, 
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are significant drivers of change, but those that have wider implications and have the capacity 
to affect the behavior of everyone else, are critical. 
 
A significant challenge in the region is to bridge the glaring gap between the macro and micro, 
the economy and environment, and short- and long-term horizons of agents. Decisions at the 
national level are often made without regard of their attendant effects on individuals and 
families while decisions of individuals are made, without regard of their wider implications 
on the country’s economy and natural resources. Economic decisions are arrived at without 
considering their consequences on forests, while forest sector decisions are generated, 
ignoring their economic implications or the surrounding economic trends. Also, decisions to 
revert a trend in the short term are implemented, without considering their long-term impacts. 
These decisions need to be made responsibly, to ensure that equitable growth proceeds 
without compromising forest resources and the right of current and future generations to 
benefit from its services. 
 
For individuals to achieve economic affluence is desirable, but not when it happens at the 
expense of forests, and in depriving and endangering future generations. Growth is desirable, 
but not when it happens by cutting the last tree that stands. Growth should come with 
responsibility, not only for the good things that it brings, but also for avoiding, if not reducing, 
its harmful impacts on people, forests, and the environment. 
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1. MACRO-ECONOMIC TRENDS AND FORESTS: CONTENTS, CHALLENGES, 
AND SOME CAVEATS 
 
The realization that the fate of forests will be determined by factors outside the forest and the 
forestry sector has become increasingly important in policy and academic discourse. A 
growing amount of empirical and anecdotal evidence has shown that significant changes in 
institutions, policies, political spaces, and macro-economic environments impinge on the 
health of forests more than the changes that occur within the sector. Thus, there is increasing 
interest to look beyond sources and immediate causes of forest health or degradation in order 
to unravel the not-so-obvious and often difficult-to-establish link between macro-level 
variables and forest condition. 
 
This paper joins the growing body of literature that seeks to understand the effects of macro-
economic trends on forests and the forestry sector. As part of the Asia Pacific Forestry Sector 
Outlook Study II (APFSOS II), it desires to outline the potential effects of changes in macro-
economic environment on the future of forests in Asia and the Pacific to 2020. It builds on a 
previous study that reviewed the social and economic developments in the nineties2 and 
analyzes current trends to develop scenarios of potential changes in the macro-economic 
environment and how these changes will likely impact on forests and forestry. 
 
Necessarily, an analysis of economic growth among countries in the region and the total 
performance of the region itself compared to other economies in the world, serves as the 
fundamental starting point of this paper. However, cognizant of the fact that economic growth 
is insufficient to explain the different changes that occur within and outside the forestry sector, 
the paper moves to analyzing the type and nature of growth, whether it is even or equitable, 
and how this affects demand and consumption patterns, labor, land use, and ultimately forests. 
Further, in an attempt to locate the arguments within a broader analytical framework but still 
mindful of the inherent contextual differences, the paper builds scenarios of the future based 
on case studies of critical economies where data are available and where most drivers for 
change in the region are situated. 
 
Analyzing the link between macro-economic trends and forestry is already in itself, a 
complicated task, and to predict what will happen in the future as regards this relationship is 
even more difficult. The paper does not intend to deal extensively with quantitative analysis 
or build models based on available data.3 Instead, it intends to present a qualitative treatment 
of the theme, drawing extensively on the wealth of academic papers, documents, reports, and 
statistics prepared by different experts, agencies, and organizations from within and outside 
the region.   
 
The paper divests three things. Firstly, it is not an original research as it bases its analysis on 
data available from different agencies who have conducted work in analyzing the economic 
development of the region4 and on country case studies conducted by various organizations. 
What the paper does is to interpret the volumes of thorough work done in the context of the 
                                                 
2 Among the working papers produced for the Asia-Pacific Forestry Sector Outlook Study I (APFSOS I) 
was a study entitled “Review of Social and Economic Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region With 
Projections to 2010” by Chipeta, Whiteman, and Brooks (1998). 
3 This is an explicit recognition of the fact that several countries in the region may be excluded in the 
analysis of some variables, even in the qualitative sense, because of constraints in data availability. 
4 The study relies on data and statistics generated by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the Asian Development Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
United Nations Statistics Division, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific, , the Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture, the Japan Center for 
Economic Research, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations.  
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theme. Secondly, it does not claim to be comprehensive so as to cover in its analysis all 
countries5 and deal with each one extensively. What the paper will attempt to do is to locate 
the specific arguments in several country case stories and arrive at generalizations based on a 
careful analysis of the cases. Finally, it does not make an attempt at modeling, as earlier 
indicated, as this would have been very ambitious in the context of data limitations and the 
high complexity of cases in the region. As the approach is largely qualitative, the paper can 
not evade application of judgment.  
 
This paper explicitly recognizes the fact that seeing through the future based entirely on past 
trends and current realities is extremely difficult, more particularly for countries in the region. 
It is important to mention here that the paper has to contend with three distinct yet interrelated 
challenges. 
 
The challenge of complexity. There have been several attempts to link macro-
economic trends and forestry with conflicting suppositions. Higher income for 
example, has been argued to be beneficial to forests as it is assumed to provide off-
farm employment opportunities and would increase demand for forest protection. On 
the other hand, higher income could also create greater demand for agricultural and 
forest products, creating the pressure to clear more land. Hence, a simplistic argument 
that economic growth is good for the forests of the world is no longer tenable. There 
is even growing evidence to suggest that forest depletion contributes to economic 
growth, thus, implying a causal relation in the opposite direction. 
 
Also, an increase in the forest cover of one country in the region need not be a good 
indicator of improved forest condition. The pressure on forests caused by logging and 
other extractive activities may have declined in one country resulting in a significant 
improvement in its forest condition, but this will ultimately escalate forest destruction 
in another as demand for timber and forest products have to be met. Thus, while there 
is value in country and context-specific analysis, it must not be divorced from 
realities within the region and even the rest of the world. 
 
The challenge of rapid change. The past twenty years or so stood witness to the 
rapidly changing economic landscape of the region. Growth rates for some economies 
referred to as the “tiger countries” in the early nineties have been unprecedented 
anywhere else in the world and have generated an enormous amount of debate in so 
far as causes and conditions are concerned. The Asian economic crisis, believed to 
have been triggered by the collapse of the Thai baht in the years following, had 
tremendous effects not only on regional but also on global economy. However since 
then, the region, as a whole has performed relatively well, both in terms of growth 
and distribution.  
 
The changes in the region cannot be divorced from the significant shifts in the 
economy of developed countries and the rest of the world. Globalization effects have 
been strongly felt in the last ten years and will continue to be of critical importance, 
especially now that the performance of the US economy is on a feared downturn and 
the financial markets there and elsewhere are very volatile. APFSOS I papers and the 
main report were written in a period of uncertainty so it provided some important 
caveats. Likewise, this paper has to do the same. 
 
The challenge of diversity. Growth performance in the region, though increasingly 
positive even in poor countries such as Bangladesh and small island countries such as 
Samoa, is nevertheless exceptionally differentiated. The rise of China and India as 
major economic players both in the region and in the world is largely responsible for 
                                                 
5 For a list of countries in Asia and the Pacific, please refer to Annex 1. 
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the increased economic performance. Stable growth performance is observed in high 
income OECD countries such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, while a highly 
volatile growth trend is observed in countries such as Brunei, Fiji, and Timor Leste. 
Countries in unstable political condition like Myanmar grew significantly along with 
relatively peaceful countries like Cambodia.  
 
Poverty and inequality within the countries in the region are also highly differentiated. 
High income countries like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore had GDP 
per capita of more than US$26,000 in 2005 while Myanmar and Nepal recorded less 
than 10% of this amount in the same year. Poverty, based on dollar-a-day criteria, is 
high in countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and India, while inequality (based 
on available recent GINI coefficient data) is more pronounced in Malaysia, Nepal, 
and the Philippines. 
 
Thus, the region presents a mosaic of different types of economies, with different 
starting points, and different growth performances; thus an attempt at generalization 
becomes a difficult task. 
 
However, the paper is certain that in the immediate future, the economies of Asia and the 
Pacific will continue to grow, albeit at differing rates and direction. As a consequence of this 
growth, structural changes will likely continue to occur both as a reaction to the demands of 
development and as a conscious strategy to create the enabling conditions for growth to 
proceed. Ultimately, the forests will not be spared from these realities as these changes will 
substantially impact on the variables that had either promoted or endangered forest health in 
the region in the past and will create new pressures in the future as the pattern of growth 
unfolds. 
 
The paper is structured into four parts. Section 2 presents the changing economic landscape of 
Asia and the Pacific giving particular attention to economic growth and distribution. The 
succeeding section analyzes the links between the predominant macro-economic trends and 
forests within the region while the final section concentrates on macro-economic projections 
and growth prospects of the region. As a conclusion, the paper will present a forward-looking 
analysis of the different economies and how they will change forestry and forests of Asia and 
the Pacific in 2020.   
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2. THE RAPIDLY CHANGING ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE OF THE ASIA PACIFIC 
REGION  
 
Rapid growth, growing significance 
 
The Asia-Pacific region is considered one of the most economically dynamic regions in the 
world. Home to two of the world’s most populous countries, to the fabled newly-
industrializing economies, and to a considerable portion of the world’s poor, it has 
experienced rapid growth and development, unparalleled in history, in the last twenty years. 
Despite the financial crisis in 1997 that affected several countries and was predicted to end 
the Asian development saga, the region continued to grow at a considerably increasing rate, 
reasserting its economic significance in the global landscape. 
 
GDP records were nothing but impressive. Growth rates after the crisis averaged 5% for the 
whole region, with East and Northeast Asia, more particularly China, taking the lead. In 2006, 
the region accounted for more that one third of global growth (UNESCAP 2007) and cornered 
around 28% of the world GDP (WB 2007) (See Figure 1). The growth of the region was 
fueled by a continuing buoyancy of the export market and an increasing domestic demand. In 
the last 30 years, the region’s share of world trade more than doubled, in contrast to Latin 
America (IMF 2006). 
 
Figure 1. Asia-Pacific’s share of world GDP in 2005, adjusted to 2000 base 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2007. 
 
Among the countries with impressive growth performance since 1998 have been China and 
India, registering annual average growth rates of 10.7% and 9.2%, respectively. China has 
started to become the export hub of the region, cornering a significant portion of exports 
while at the same time exhibiting increased demand for raw materials from other countries. 
China is undertaking a rather aggressive growth policy, going beyond Asian boundaries to 
satisfy production demand for raw materials as well as to establish new markets for its 
manufactured products. In recent years, the country has attracted a significant amount of 
foreign direct investments (FDI), making it the world’s largest recipient of FDI in 2004.   
 
India, on the other hand, grew significantly with the service sector as its primary growth 
engine. Revenues from different services – ranging from communications, tourism, finance, 
insurance, information technology, and real estate, among others – outperformed the primary 
and secondary sectors. The “call center” and ICT sector in India have grown so dramatically 
33%
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in recent years that they have become a burgeoning industry initiating rapid changes to the 
country’s social and economic structures.   
 
Similar patterns of growth performance are seen in 
other countries of Emerging Asia.6 Thailand, for 
example, a country that posted a post-crisis 7 
annual average growth rate of 4.8%, increasingly 
relied on manufactured exports to boost its growth 
in the last ten years (Poapongsakorn et al. 2006) 
while the Republic of Korea, with a similar 
average growth performance as Thailand, relied on 
export-led industrialization backed by a dynamic 
agriculture sector (Song 2006).   
 
Industrialized economies of the region, however, 
do not share the same growth trajectory. New 
Zealand and Australia have had similar growth 
performance at around 3% per annum in the last 
ten years while Japan posted a post-crisis annual 
average growth rate of 1.92%. New Zealand and 
Australia’s growth rates are stable and Japan shows 
a 
certain 
degree of recovery from economic stagnation 
caused by an “overly lengthy investment boom”, 
fiscal contractions and monetary policy 
inefficiencies (Posen 2003, OECD 2006). 
 
The growth experience of the small island 
developing states (SIDS) of the Pacific varied 
enormously, given the different condition of the 
countries. However, almost all of the developing 
economies 8  in the Pacific had the slowest 
growth rates in the past ten years significantly 
due to their vulnerability to natural, political, 
and economic shocks (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2006). Aside from low economic 
growth rates, the countries also experienced 
very volatile growth performance. A good 
example is Fiji that has had an overall average 
growth of only 2.4% since 1998 but with 
significant contractions in between, even 
registering a negative growth rate in 2000. 
 
While growth is impressive, GDP in real terms 
indicates a less than phenomenal achievement. For example, while Vietnam grew rapidly, it 
started off from a very low GDP base so that its GDP in 2005 was immaterial when compared 
                                                 
6 We use here IMF’s categorization which lists the countries of China, India, Hongkong SAR, Republic 
of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam. 
7 Post-crisis here means the 1997 financial crisis that hit Asia. 
8 Developing economies refer to all countries in the region as indicated in Annex 1 of this document 
excluding the industrialized economies of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand and the newly 
industrialized countries of Republic of Korea and Singapore. 
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Figure 2. Comparative growth 
performance of China and India with 
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WB, 2007). 
In Billion USD
0 3000 6000 9000 12000
USA
Japan
China
UK
India
Thailand
Vietnam
GDP 2005
Figure 3.  GDP in 2005 ( in 2000 USD 
billions), select countries  (Source: WB, 
2007). 
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to other Asian economies, much more with the rest of the developed economies. On the other 
hand, though China’s consistent growth rate is approximately eight notches higher than the 
United States, its GDP in 2005 is significantly lower than the US, and even lower than Japan 
whose growth is considered to have stagnated in recent years (See Figure 3). 
 
It is acknowledged however, that comparing GDP amounts across countries is rather 
impractical and unfounded since countries, as those included in Figure 3, have different factor 
endowments (e.g. land, labor, capital), demographic and geographical characteristics, quality 
of institutions, and economic policies. The purpose to highlight this in the paper, however, is 
to caution on the excessive fascination on growth rates to characterize the improvements of 
the Asian economies, and to indicate that while growth rates were indeed phenomenal, this 
pales in comparison with those of developed economies in real terms.   
Figure 4. Average growth rate against average GDP per capita (1996-2005), 
profile of Asia-Pacific Countries  
 
Comparing growth rates against GDP per capita (see Figure 4), countries may be classified 
according to their performance over the last ten years. The industrialized countries in the 
region (Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) occupy one quadrant characterized by low but 
stable growth rates but with fairly large GDP per capita. Singapore and Republic of Korea, 
together with Hong Kong SAR constitute the newly industrialized economies characterized 
by high growth rates and relatively high GDP per capita.9 The economies of India, China, 
Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand 10  and Sri Lanka are considered as 
countries of Emerging Asia11 that have high growth rates and modest GDP per capita. Finally, 
the last quadrant of countries constitute Developing Asia-Pacific that includes the remaining 
                                                 
9 Malaysia’s recent growth experience qualifies it for this group when median GDP per capita and 
growth rates are used but it would fall out when mean figures are used as a separator. Due to the wide 
income gap between Malaysia and Republic of Korea, Malaysia is included in the second quartile. 
10 Thailand’s average growth rates are low as indicated by the graph. This is largely driven by the effect 
of the Asian financial crisis that hit the country the hardest. Nevertheless, the country is classified 
together with the rest of the group owing to its relatively high GDP per capita compared to the others in 
the classification. 
11 The term Emerging Asia is a classification used by the International Monetary Fund (2007) to denote 
the same countries as mentioned in this classification but also includes the newly industrialized 
economies. 
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countries in the region that have low GDP per capita and variable growth rates. This 
classification is instructive rather than prescriptive and is mainly used to characterize general 
trends that occur in the region. 
 
The differentiated growth performance of the economies in the region brought significant 
variations in the economic relationships of countries. It is true that growth in the region has 
been increasingly reliant on external demand and investment, more particularly from the US, 
but the rise of China and India as well as the revival of the Japanese economy after the asset 
bubble in the 1990s, contributed further to this dynamism.  
 
China’s rise as a major economic player in the region presented both opportunities and 
disadvantages to other countries. While it provides greater demand for primary and secondary 
products, it also exerts pressures on other countries as it competes directly with the latter’s 
major exports. For example, China competes with Indonesia in electrical machinery and 
equipment (UNESCAP 2007) while it buys from Indonesia electrical products to form part of 
its industrial goods. More importantly, China also competes with domestic enterprises in 
neighboring countries in meeting local consumption demands as evidenced by the 
proliferation of Chinese-made consumer goods in local country markets. 
 
The significant economic prominence of the service sector in India on the other hand, has 
threatened other countries. The growth of its outsourcing and offshore service support sector 
affected the growth of the same service sector in the Philippines. The ranking of India in 
terms of global competitiveness12, like that of China, has overtaken other economies in the 
region like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka, making it more attractive for foreign direct 
investments, and thus intensifying competition of financial capital in the region. 
 
Growth, poverty, and inequality 
 
Having said this, it is also worth pointing out that what makes the Asian growth experience 
more remarkable is its underlying effect on poverty and inequality that is relatively successful 
as compared to the other developing regions in the world. GDP per capita in the region has an 
expansive range, with the lowest registered by Myanmar in 2005 at US$216.50 and the 
highest by Japan at US$35,593.26 in the same year. Nevertheless, country analysis would 
suggest that while this is so, significant improvements are observed when compared to twenty 
years ago. Almost all countries have increased GDP per capita from the 1990 base figures, 
though significant decreases were observed in 2000 after the 1997 financial crisis (see Figure 
5).   
 
                                                 
12 The World Economic Forum defines competitiveness as the “set of institutions, policies, and factors 
that determine the level of productivity of a country” (WEF 2007). The global competitiveness ranking 
makes use of 12 pillars – institutions, infrastructure, macro-economy, health and primary education, 
higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market 
sophistication, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. 
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Figure 5. GDP per capita (at current USD prices) – selected countries from 1990 
to 2005 (Source: UNSD/UNESCAP, December 2006) 
 
With the exception of Solomon Islands and DPR Korea, all countries in the region increased 
GDP per capita from 1990 base figures implying improved living conditions of its people.13 
Among the countries, Vietnam, whose GDP per capita was among the lowest in the region 
since 1990 (below US$200, current prices), increased its GDP per capita fivefold from 1990 
base figures. Vietnam’s performance is remarkable in as much as it started off with smaller 
GDP per capita than Nepal, Cambodia, and Myanmar, but has overtaken the GDP per capita 
amounts of the latter countries in twenty years. China (excluding Hong Kong and Macau) also 
experienced a similar feat in improved living conditions as its GDP per capita increased 
threefold overtaking the Philippines and Indonesia who had higher GDP per capita figures in 
1990. 
 
Among the industrialized countries in the region, only in Japan is a declining GDP per capita 
observable as its growth performance slowed down, starting in 1995. Australia, however, has 
improved significantly its living conditions since 2000 with an increase in GDP per capita of 
64% over a five year period. New Zealand decreased growth performance in 2000 in terms of 
GDP per capita, mainly due to external shocks such as the Asian financial crisis and persistent 
droughts (Conway and Orr, 2000) but has nevertheless recovered since then. 
 
Increased affluence of people in emerging Asia has benefited economic growth in the region. 
Domestic demand increased in South Asia and China, thereby signaling greater production 
and use of traded raw materials, hence increased demand within the country and from other 
exporting economies. Even major economies of the region such as Australia, for example, 
                                                 
13 It is acknowledged here that GDP per capita is insufficient to indicate improved standards of living 
as poverty is multi-dimensional. However, the indicator is used to point to improvements in living 
conditions that can be indicated by greater availability of disposable income. 
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benefited from this trend as most of its exports go to China and India. Correspondingly, 
improved living conditions and earning capacities of people, coupled with the appreciation of 
local currencies of countries has also impacted on tourism activities as more people are now 
capacitated to travel. An example here is the appreciation of the Korean won relative to other 
currencies that significantly increased tourists from the Republic of Korea to other regions 
such as Thailand where were they comprised the largest group of arrivals next to Japan in 
2006 (TAT 2006). 
 
As the GDP per capita figures suggest, the largely differentiated improvements in living 
conditions across countries caused the migration of skilled and unskilled workers from one 
Asian country to another, contrary to the past where migration trends favored countries in the 
west like the United States and Europe. Countries with lower GDP per capita, and 
correspondingly lower labor productivity, are major exporters of skilled labor for relatively 
wealthy economies in the region. Consequently, migration has played an important role, not 
only in improving household incomes of migrant families left in home countries but also in 
increasing national wealth.   
 
Workers’ remittance as a share of GDP is particularly high in Mongolia (12.12%), Nepal 
(11.78%), the Philippines (10.40%) and Sri Lanka (7.69%) in 2004. The share of workers’ 
remittances in GDP in Mongolia even exceeded the share of agriculture implying the 
declining productivity of the agricultural sector. In the Pacific SIDS, the poor economic 
performance and the dearth of economic opportunities prompted a significant portion of its 
work force to go elsewhere, but more particularly to New Zealand and Australia, and in the 
case of Micronesian countries, the United States. Correspondingly, the share of workers’ 
remittances in the GDP of countries as Samoa and Tonga rose to 19% and 43%, respectively. 
 
Poverty condition, using 
the dollar-a-day criteria, 
has shown impressive 
results when compared 
to other poor regions in 
the world. Among the 
developing regions, the 
Asia-Pacific has shown 
the sharpest decline 
compared to Latin 
America and Sub-
Saharan Africa (see 
Figure 6) in roughly 25 
years.   
 
 
 
Figure 6. Regional decline in poverty conditions 
 
Though overall, the region has exhibited improved poverty condition14, a closer look at 
countries would reveal that most of these improvements were driven by lower middle income 
countries such as China, Indonesia, and the Philippines that were able to reduce poverty 
                                                 
14 Poverty statistics using the dollar-a-day criteria are not available for the SIDS of the Pacific for 
several reasons (ADB 2004). First, data gathering and estimation were not done properly by the SIDS 
as poverty was considered least likely due to strong family ties and the strength of subsistence 
agriculture. Second, monetary poverty as a measure, including the dollar-a-day criteria is considered 
inappropriate in their context. Hence, it is not that poverty is not present in the countries, but rather, the 
manner of ascertaining its depth and magnitude is absent. 
Figure 6. Comparative Performance on Poverty Reduction (Source: 
ADB, 2007) 
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incidence by 70% (from 1990), 57% (from 1993), and 25% (from 1991) respectively. Most 
low income countries, more particularly Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Lao PDR recorded 
higher poverty rates, and higher numbers of people living below the poverty line in 2000-
2002 as compared to the previous years, though they too experienced significantly high 
growth rates. Among all countries with decreased poverty rates between 1990 to 2004, the 
number of poor people in Cambodia increased as compared to the past (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Population below the poverty line, comparative, countries with 
available data (source: WB, 2007) 
Population Below Poverty Line (1 USD per day PPP), 1990 to 2004 
Country Earliest (in 
millions) 
Latest (in 
millions) 
Earliest (as % of 
Population) 
Latest (as % of 
population) 
China 339.16 (1992) 128.36 (2004) 29.1 (1992) 9.9 (2004)
Mongolia 0.30 (1995) 0.27 (2002) 13.3 (1995) 10.8 (2002)
Indonesia 32.55 (1993) 16.48 (2002) 17.4 (1993) 7.8 (2002)
Malaysia 0.08 (1992) 0.03 (1997) 0.4 (1992) 0.1 (1997)
Philippines 12.60 (1991) 10.38 (2000) 20.2 (1991) 13.5 (2000)
Thailand 3.44 (1992) 0.56 (2002) 6.0 (1992) 0.9 (2002)
Vietnam 10.09 (1992) 0.48 (2004) 14.6 (1992) 0.6 (2004)
Cambodia 8.51 (1994) 9.11 (2004) 82.0 (1994) 66.0 (2004)
Lao, PDR 0.81 (1992) 1.51 (2002) 18.6 (1992) 27.4 (2002)
Bangladesh 37.75 (1992) 54.12 (2000) 33.7 (1992) 41.3 (2000)
India 453.91 (1992) 370.67 (2004) 51.4 (1992) 34.3 (2004)
Pakistan 17.71 (1999) 13.73 (2004) 13.5 (1992) 9.0 (2004)
Nepal 7.04 (1995) 6.52 (2004) 34.4 (1995) 24.1 (2004)
Sri Lanka 0.65 (1990) 1.10 (2002) 3.8 (1990) 5.8 (2002)
 
Also, inequality15 in the region has not improved. This provides considerable proof to the 
argument that growth is unrelated to inequality (Dollar and Kraay 2004) as some countries 
with good growth performance such as Vietnam saw increased inequality compared to those 
which experienced growth drawbacks like Nepal. However, the tendency of growth to favor 
the higher income group of the population (Chen and Ravallion 2003) is somehow true in 
most developing economies in the region as the growth experience is accompanied by rising 
inequality16 and the poorest 20% account only for between 4-11% of the national income or 
consumption of most countries (ADB 2007). Also, within countries, inequality between 
regions is pronounced as poverty is significantly higher in some states or provinces as 
compared to others (e.g. Sri Lanka’s north, India’s Bihar, the Philippine south, Thailand’s 
northeast, among others).  
 
Among the industrialized countries in the region, relative poverty17 also decreased in 2000 
with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand having poverty rates higher than the OECD average 
(d’Ercole 2006). Japan’s Gini coefficient rose much faster compared to the average of OECD 
countries while in Australia, inequality decreased between 1970 to 1990 (OECD 2003). This 
alludes to the argument earlier mentioned that growth is unrelated to inequality. Also, the 
argument that growth favors the higher income group in a given population is held true in 
Australia when in the mid-1990s, the share of the poorest 30% of the country’s national 
                                                 
15  As indicated by the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient “measures the extent to which the 
distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country, deviates 
from a perfectly equal distribution: (WB 2006).   
16 For countries where comparative data exists, only Mongolia, Thailand, and Pakistan have decreasing 
Gini coefficients. This, however, takes only into consideration the data in 1990 and onwards. Ravallion 
(2004) argues that growth is normally distribution-neutral using a dataset of 80 countries spanning 
1980 to 2000.   
17 Relative poverty is measured through relative poverty rates which are calculated with respect to two 
thresholds: 50% and 60% of median equivalized household disposable income (d’Ercole 2006). 
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earnings was only 6.3% while the richest 30% cornered 57% of the total income (Forster and 
Pearson 2002). 
 
These statistics offer significant implications. First, growth need not necessarily translate to 
better living conditions of all people, regardless of whether the country is high income or not. 
The variety of experiences of the countries in the region converges at this particular point – 
where the thesis that pursuing growth means reducing poverty and inequality is questionable 
and empirically uninformed.   
 
Second, improvements or deterioration in living condition is a consequence of several factors, 
and not only economic growth, though it is acknowledged that it is important. The “trickle 
down” sequencing assumption – where improvements in the lives of the richest will trickle 
their benefits to the poorest does not hold true in the region as with the rest of the world.    
 
Third, economic growth will normally increase incomes of people but at largely differentiated 
rates, and this is true both for rich and poor countries. One significant driver for this 
differentiation is the underlying sector from where the poor people come and from which 
growth takes impressive scale. As such, it is not only about growth but how this growth 
transforms the various structures in the economy that would help explain its consequent effect 
on poverty.  
 
Growth on shifting sands 
 
It has been common knowledge that the success of most rapid developers in the region was 
preceded by significant improvements in agriculture (more notably, Taiwan, Republic of 
Korea, and even China) but most countries in the region since then have concentrated on both 
manufactured exports and services. Electronics and ICT have become increasingly important 
in Southeast Asia, while export-oriented manufacturing of garments and apparel has 
contributed significantly to growth in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Tourism continues to assert 
its significance in the economic development of Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Bhutan, 
Mongolia and the Pacific Islands of Fiji, Palau, and Samoa. Hence, growth in the region is 
accompanied by rapid transformation of the economic structures of its countries. 
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Source: UNESCAP, 2007. 
 
The growth of the region can be analyzed in different dimensions, but the focus of this paper 
is to scrutinize how sectoral contributions have changed in the past years. As indicated in 
Figure 7, the share of agriculture in GDP for most countries has dramatically decreased since 
1990, more particularly for China and India. A steady increase in the share of services in 
India’s GDP has been observable since 1990 with a slight decline in the share of the industrial 
sector while China offers a contrasting example as the decline in the share of agriculture in 
GDP was accompanied by an increase in the industry but a declining share of the service 
sector.  
 
These changes also occur in the low income countries of the region such as Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Vietnam, and Bhutan – countries that are traditionally dependent on agriculture to 
fuel their economy – and significantly increased the share of industry in the national income, 
decreasing agriculture’s share by more than 20% (see Table 2). In the Asia-Pacific countries, 
all countries saw a decline in the share of agriculture and a shift mostly to the service sector as 
drivers for GDP growth. In general, only in the DP Korea has agriculture’s share in GDP 
consistently increased since 1990. 
 
However, this sectoral shift in the economic composition of the countries in the region is not 
accompanied by similar deconstruction of employment and livelihood condition of the 
population. Except for a few select countries, more particularly the industrialized and newly-
industrialized economies, the majority of the people in the region, and more notably the 
poorest, rely on agriculture for livelihood.18 
                                                 
18 A qualification needs to be indicated in this statement. The generalization is based on employment 
statistics per sector of countries where data are available. There is the argument that while agricultural 
sector employment is high, this does not necessarily mean that people derive all their income from 
farming activities, as farmers also engage in off-farm livelihood which is not captured in employment 
statistics. While this is true, the amount of income from off-farm employment need not necessarily be 
large enough to distort the generalization. In India, for example, only 11.2% of the income of farming 
households comes from non-farm business receipts, but this is concentrated among farmers whose farm 
sizes are relatively small, indicating insufficiency of farm yield to meet consumption and livelihood 
needs (NCEUS 2007). 
Figure 7. Share of agriculture, services and industry to GDP
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Table 2. Changes in the sectoral contribution to GDP between 1990 and 2005 
(source: UNESCAP, author’s calculations) 
 
Among the countries in the region (for those where data is available), more people in 
Myanmar, Vietnam, and China, are dependent on agriculture for livelihood as 63%, 58% and 
57%, respectively, are employed in the agricultural sector (UNESCAP 2007). Unfortunately, 
    % Change (in actual values) % Change (% of change) 
    Agriculture Service Industry Agriculture Service Industry
North Asia             
  China (0.15) (0.04) 0.18 (0.57) (0.12) 0.45 
  Hong Kong (0.00) 0.16 (0.15) (0.76) 0.21 (0.62)
  Japan (0.01) 0.07 (0.06) (0.31) 0.12 (0.16)
  Korea, DPR 0.07 0.07 (0.14) 0.27  0.37 (0.26)
  Korea, Republic (0.04) (0.01) 0.06 (0.46) (0.02) 0.14 
  Macau 0.00 0.11 (0.11)   0.15 (0.46)
  Mongolia (0.04) 0.09 (0.05) (0.25) 0.20 (0.12)
Southeast Asia             
  Indonesia (0.05) 0.01 0.04 (0.24) 0.04 0.09 
  Malaysia (0.08) 0.07 0.02 (0.53) 0.15 0.04 
  Philippines (0.03) 0.05 (0.02) (0.14) 0.11 (0.06)
  Thailand (0.05) (0.04) 0.09 (0.35) (0.08) 0.24 
  Vietnam (0.14) (0.02) 0.17 (0.36) (0.06) 0.71 
  Brunei 0.00 0.06 (0.06) 0.20  0.13 (0.12)
  Burma Myanmar (0.07) 0.01 0.06 (0.12) 0.03 0.56 
  Cambodia (0.14) (0.01) 0.15 (0.27) (0.03) 1.28 
  
Lao, People's Democratic 
Republic (0.16) 0.01 0.15 (0.27) 0.06 1.05 
  Singapore (0.00) 0.02 (0.02) (0.67) 0.03 (0.05)
South Asia             
  Bangladesh (0.06) (0.01) 0.06 (0.20) (0.01) 0.30 
  India (0.13) 0.13 0.00 (0.42) 0.31 0.01 
  Maldives (0.09) 0.07 0.02 (0.49) 0.10 0.11 
  Pakistan (0.04) 0.03 0.01 (0.15) 0.05 0.06 
  Bhutan (0.20) 0.05 0.16 (0.47) 0.14 0.64 
  Nepal (0.09) 0.06 0.04 (0.18) 0.19 0.22 
  Sri Lanka (0.10) 0.04 0.05 (0.37) 0.09 0.18 
The Pacific             
  Australia (0.01) 0.05 (0.04) (0.20) 0.07 (0.13)
  New Zealand 0.00 0.01 (0.02) 0.07  0.02 (0.09)
  Fiji (0.05) 0.02 0.04 (0.29) 0.03 0.18 
  French Polynesia (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) (0.24) 0.03 (0.06)
  Kiribati (0.11) 0.05 0.06 (0.59) 0.06 0.80 
  Marshall Islands (0.04) (0.02) 0.06 (0.28) (0.03) 0.48 
  
Micronesia, Federated 
States of (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 
  New Caledonia (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) (0.00) 0.01 
  Papua New Guinea (0.02) (0.14) 0.07 (0.06) (0.29) 0.22 
  Samoa (0.07) 0.09 (0.03) (0.34) 0.18 (0.09)
  Solomon Islands 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00  0.00 (0.02)
  Tonga (0.09) 0.13 (0.04) (0.26) 0.26 (0.25)
  Tuvalu (0.12) 0.11 0.01 (0.46) 0.18 0.07 
  Vanuatu New Hebrides (0.04) 0.10 (0.06) (0.19) 0.15 (0.41)
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the people in the agricultural sector in these countries are most disadvantaged as labor 
productivity19 is relatively low compared to others (at less than US$500, 1990 constant prices, 
compared to Thailand’s US$869.41 and the Philippines’ US$1,136.91). This, notwithstanding 
the fact that labor productivity in agriculture is the lowest among the three sectors.20 
 
Nevertheless, the population’s agriculture dependence has been gradually decreasing in most 
countries in the region. As indicated in Table 3, the number of people employed in the 
agricultural sector decreased between the period 1990 and 2005. This was accompanied by 
increases in the number of people employed in service and industry. In both absolute and 
relative terms, the movement of labor away from agriculture to the service and industry 
sectors has become increasingly evident, with countries experiencing different trajectories.  
 
Table 3. Employment share of sectors, comparative (source: UNESCAP) 
 
However, it has to be emphasized, that while agriculture’s relevance in advancing economic 
development has diminished dramatically, the restructuring of the labor economy to conform 
                                                 
19 Labor productivity is defined as output per unit of labor input and shows the GDP per employed 
person in a particular sector. This is computed by dividing the share of agriculture in GDP by the 
number of persons employed in the agricultural sector. 
20 For example, in Indonesia, labor productivity of agriculture was US$854 (1990 constant prices) in 
2005, compared to industry’s US$6,037 and services’ US$2,839. 
Earliest year (in 000's) Latest year (in 000's) 
  Agriculture Service Industry Agriculture Service Industry 
North Asia   
  China 341170 63400 121220 324870 119010 130480
  Hong Kong 23 1692 996.2 10 2862.6 513.6
  Japan 4510 36380 21290 2820 42230 17750
  
Korea, 
Republic 3237 8451 6406 1815 14903.8 6136.9
  Taiwan             
  Macau 0 93.38 69.32 1 177.5 59.9
  Mongolia 302 306.1 157.1 386 419.3 162.8
Southeast Asia             
  Indonesia 42378 22928.6 11098.3 41814 36068.78 17065.136
  Malaysia 1738 3106.9 1840.2 1476 5502.9 3007.3
  Philippines 10185 8946 3386 12171 15820 4883
  Thailand 19726 6773.6 4321.3 15449 13455.8 7350
  Vietnam 24674 510.5 4209.7 24498 10474.739 7343.037
  
Burma 
Myanmar 10614 3205 1406 11507 4617 2235
  Singapore 4 983 536.1 6 1092.4 669.5
South Asia             
  Bangladesh 33303 8101 6505 22931 15329 6064
  Maldives 15 20.9 16.022 12 25.169 16.377
  Pakistan 15241 8616 5904 18431 15671 8693
  Sri Lanka 2851 1787 1226.7 2381 2684.4 1624.172
The Pacific             
  Australia 439 5432 1964.9 363 7470.3 2100.4
  New Zealand 157 955 363.9 148 1463.4 456.2
1 All earliest year figures are in 1990, except for Maldives-1995, Mongolia-1993, Singapore - 
1991, and Vietnam - 1996 
2 All latest year figures are in 2005, except Maldives - 2000, Bangladesh - 2003, China - 2002, 
Malaysia - 2004, Myanmar - 1998, and Sri Lanka - 2003. 
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to this trend happened at a very slow and tiring pace (see Figure 8). Thus, while agriculture 
may have lost its importance as a producer of GDP, it has not lost its importance in providing 
livelihood and employment to a vast majority of people in the region. 
 
The recent World Development Report (WDR 2008) of the World Bank highlighted the role 
of agriculture in economic development and poverty reduction and classified countries 
according to agriculture’s place in economic development21 (WB 2007). The Bank argues that 
countries may be classified in three categories: agriculture-based, transforming, and 
industrialized countries. We use the same categorization here to determine the shifts in the 
economies of the region. 
Figure 8. Share of agriculture in labor and GDP against GDP per capita 
 
As indicated in Figure 8, high income countries (both industrialized and newly-industrialized) 
are characterized by the low significance, if not insignificance of agriculture in both labor and 
economic development. Countries such as Thailand, China, Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia, countries of Emerging Asia, can be considered economies in transition where 
agriculture has a declining significance. Finally, Developing Asia-Pacific is primarily 
agriculture-based, with a few exceptions of some Pacific SIDS, where traditionally, 
agriculture does not play a major role in the national economy.  
 
What do this mean for the future of the region’s economy? 
 
The Asian growth experience has been so impressive in the past that it prompted several 
agencies such as the OECD, ADB, WB, and the IMF to project more robust economic future 
for the region. This growth experience was set against a landscape of challenging 
uncertainties – increasing prices in oil, strong inflationary tendencies, and projected 
deceleration of the US economy. Despite these challenges however, most of the Asian 
economies have proved to be resilient and adaptive, hence increasing the possibility of strong 
growth prospects. 
 
Alongside this rapid growth experience is a transition process, where countries are gradually 
moving beyond reliance on the primary sector, more notably agriculture, towards a more 
                                                 
21 In this case, the bank used two variables we also indicated in this paper – the share of labour in 
agriculture and the share of GDP in agriculture as dimensions. 
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sophisticated economic structure largely dominated by services and industry. These shifts in 
the economy require different sets of capacities and competencies to which countries need to 
respond to be able to compete. In the context of increasing globalization, the growth of the 
countries, especially those of emerging and developing Asia-Pacific will proceed, albeit at 
differing rates and more probably at a declining pace. 
 
This trend has significant implications not only on people but also on natural resources from 
which most of the growth of the now developed countries was derived. Undoubtedly, growth 
and development will exert pressures on natural resources as the demands for goods and 
services will increase as economies grow. The effects of these changes will also be largely 
differentiated across countries, depending on the economic condition that countries, and more 
importantly, households are in. How these changes will impact on natural resources, but more 
particularly on forests will be dealt with in the succeeding section. 
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3. LINKING MACRO-ECONOMIC TRENDS AND FORESTS  
 
Structural transformation and forests 
The growth of Asian economies is characterized by a corresponding structural transformation 
of its economic base. From a purely agricultural economy in the early half of the 20th century, 
the countries slowly moved to a state of increased reliance on both service and industry to 
propel their development. This transformation, coupled with increasing household wealth, is 
assumed to impact positively on natural resources, and more specifically on forests. The 
conventional argument is that, when this transformation happens, more land will be freed 
from agriculture as people move towards the service and industry sectors and that because 
people experience increased income, their tendency to extract resources – either to clear 
forests to grow crops or to cut and sold trees – will be dampened.  
 
The link, in this case, however, is far from simple. A shift in growth drivers from agriculture 
to services and industry need not necessarily mean decreased pressures for converting forest 
lands to farms, when this is set against a backdrop of increasing rural population and where 
most people live on agriculture for livelihoods (see Box 1). This becomes more especially so, 
if access to livelihoods in the service and industry sectors is restrictive so as not to absorb 
those with low level of education, thus resulting in increased agricultural activity even as 
growth continues. 
 
 
 
Box 1. Challenging Conventional Wisdom 1: Vietnam’s Economic Growth and Forests 
 
The current economic performance of Vietnam and its optimistic future is largely attributable to a 
successful reform process that started in the early 1980s and continues until now, aimed primarily at 
ensuring that the institutional and regulatory frameworks hasten the efficient functioning of markets. 
A major component of the reform process was the reallocation of land lending vibrancy to agriculture 
that was also able to absorb labor displaced by the necessary restructuring of its industrial sector. 
Later, reforms in the countries’ financial, taxation, and trade policies, as well as the emergence of 
private enterprises stimulated further agricultural production and increased exports.  
 
Since then, however, agriculture’s role in advancing the economy became dwarfed by the industrial 
and service sectors. While it has grown rapidly from its very low base during the “central planning 
years” and its output consistently grew at an average of 5% in the last twenty years, its share in GDP 
has decreased significantly, from 41.7% in 1986 to 1989 to 23% between 2000-2004. But most of the 
population is still in rural villages (around 75% in 2004) and more people are still dependent on 
farming and fishing for livelihoods (62% in 2004).   
 
Has this structural transformation in the economy aided the forests? 
 
The state of forests in Vietnam, however, has declined over the course of this transformation. Between 
1980 and 1995, natural forest area decreased due to agricultural expansion in the uplands as a 
consequence of both population growth and migration. Increasing demand for food crops and the 
declining productivity of land forced farmers to expand agricultural production even in less suitable 
areas, further encroaching on forestland. Wood exploitation for both rural and urban needs 
accentuated this trend. 
 
But as current figures will suggest, (see Table 4, for example), the state of Vietnam’s forests has 
significantly improved in the early 2000s. The reforestation program of the government was aided by 
several attending circumstances – the distribution of forestry land to households, new forest 
management practices, and food crop intensification – that hastened the improvement of forest 
conditions.  
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Table 4. Size of forest and agricultural area (source: FAOSTAT) 
Forest Area 
Agricultural 
Area Forest Area 
Agricultural 
Area 
  1990 2005 1990 2005   1990 2005 1990 2005 
North Asia          South Asia          
  China  157141 197290 531398 556328   Bangladesh 882 871 10037 9011
  Japan  24950 24868 5693 4692   India  63939 67701 181040 180180
  
Korea, 
Republic 6371 6265 2179 1881   Maldives  0.9 0.9 9 14
  
Korea, 
DPR 8201 6187 2518 3050   Pakistan  2527 1902 25940 27070
  Mongolia  11492 10252 125656 130460   Bhutan  3035 3195 432 592
Southeast 
Asia            Nepal  4817 3636 4153 4222
  Indonesia  116567 88495 45083 47800   Sri Lanka  2350 1933 2339 2356
  Malaysia  22376 20890 7224 7870 The Pacific         
  Philippines  10574 7162 11140 12200   Australia  167904 163678 464481 445149
  Thailand  15965 14520 21383 18600   
New 
Zealand  7720 8309 17489 17269
  Vietnam  9363 12931 6726 9592   Fiji  979 1000 410 460
  Brunei  313 278 13 25   
French 
Polynesia  105 105 43 45
  Myanmar  39219 32222 10428 11268   
New 
Caledonia  717 717 232 249
  Cambodia  12946 10447 4455 5356   
Papua New 
Guinea  31523 29437 907 1065
  Lao, PDR 17314 16142 1660 1959   Samoa  130 171 98 93
  Singapore  2.3 2.3 2 0.8   
Solomon 
Islands  2768 2172 70 85
            Tonga  3.6 3.6 32 30
            
Vanuatu 
New 
Hebrides 439.5 439.5 140 147
 
As earlier indicated, while agriculture was starting to lose its central position in the economies 
of Asia, it still is a major provider of livelihood, more particularly for the rural poor. Thus, 
while industrial centers started to attract labor from the rural sector, countries were still 
plagued with the problem of inadequate labor absorption thus heightening the need for 
alternative sources of employment and even the growth of the undocumented (informal) 
sector. In most of these countries, natural resources, and agriculture for that matter, are the 
safety nets when livelihood shocks occur (see Box 2) and the increasing inequality that 
accompanied growth was detrimental to forests as it reinforced dependence on the natural 
resource base (Koop and Tole 2001). This argument is increasingly significant when 
transition from agriculture to the service and industry sectors happens only in select packets 
of areas within a particular country, hardly showing any inclination on others. 
 
Also, increased income of people brought about by off-farm employment may not reduce land 
conversion when this is accompanied by increased demand for food and other agricultural 
products. The increased demand for food results in increased production requirement that 
affects not only demand for agricultural products but prices as well. In most cases, the 
increased demand, as well as its attendant profitability, was met through agricultural 
expansion that encroached on the region’s forest frontiers (Maertens et al. 2006).  
APFSOS II: Macro-economic trends and their impacts on forests and forestry 
 26
 
 
Thus, economic growth and structural transformation may result in forest health under certain 
circumstances, and may be detrimental to forests in others. There is no such thing as a clear-
cut causation that can be established, especially when considering individual country cases. 
The links between structural transformation of the economy and health of forests is relatively 
weak because of technical and fundamental reasons. For one, when forest cover is used to 
indicate status of forests, quality of data has been repetitively questioned due to inefficiencies 
in estimation, reporting, and even changes in figures, mainly due to reclassification.  
 
 
       Figure 9. Total versus partial structural shifts in the economy 
 
Secondly, economic growth and forest health run on a reverse causality problem. At one end, 
economic growth may decrease pressures on forests by improving off farm employment or 
stimulate more forest clearing because of increase in domestic demand for food and other 
necessities. Conversely, forest depletion may contribute to economic growth, such as how 
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Box 2. Challenging Conventional Wisdom 2: Boom and Bust in Thailand’s Agriculture 
 
Agriculture, in the 1960s was Thailand’s primary engine of growth, with an annual growth rate of 5.7%, 
fueled by massive agricultural expansion into forested areas and large public investments in 
infrastructure. Agriculture was then the primary source of export earnings and the main provider of 
livelihood. But starting in the 1980s, the time at which the country started to experience significant 
economic growth, agriculture lost its comparative advantage. The domestic terms of trade drastically 
changed as prices of non-traded goods, produced mainly by non-agricultural sectors rose, stimulating 
rapid growth of non-agricultural capital. Consequently, labor productivity outside the farm sector 
increased, causing a squeeze on farm profits, a decrease in agricultural investment, and a decline in the 
share of the sector relative to services and industry. 
 
Labor structure in the country has drastically changed over the growth period. After 1989, close to three 
million workers, around 11% of the total labor force “walked off the land” that spurred a decline in 
planted area and agricultural output. Around 1996, share of non-agricultural labor almost equaled that of 
the share of agriculture, and has since overtaken the latter, except only in 1997. As an effect of the Asian 
crisis that caused massive displacement of skilled and semi-skilled workers in construction and labor-
intensive manufacturing, there was a reported “back to the farm” exodus. Nevertheless, post-crisis non-
agricultural employment has since increased and because of this, it was argued that there wasn’t really a 
migration of labor to the agriculture sector, but just a temporary halt to labor participation in the industry 
and service sectors, and a greater engagement of the work force in informal activities. Sufficient 
evidence to this claim however, is not yet explored.  
 
Between 1960 and 1980, forest cover in Thailand tremendously declined by almost half its original size, 
primarily due to shifting cultivation and accentuated by logging, infrastructure development, and weak 
implementation of forestry laws. However, despite the rapid transformation of the economy biased 
against agriculture, decrease in forest cover continued even towards the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. 
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logging has contributed to growth of countries like Indonesia and Papua New Guinea 
(Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999). 
 
More importantly however, what weakens the growth and structural transformation argument 
is the relative inadequacy of cases to support the claim, especially in the case of developing 
countries in the region. In most cases, growth is accompanied only by a partial structural shift 
in the economy (see Figure 9) characterized by the declining significance of agriculture as a 
generator of GDP but a continuing reliance of the majority of the rural population on 
agriculture as a source of livelihood and the greater propensity to use natural resources, or 
forests for that matter, as sources of immediate cash. In this case, forests are endangered 
because people may clear more land for farms or cut trees for timber when the need occurs.   
 
Further, this structural transformation indicated in income and employment figures is 
aggregated at the national level, masking variations in the regional areas. In several cases, 
while a few regions in a single country have massive transformations in its economic 
structures, others have lagged behind (see Box 3). 
    
 
 
 
The differences between countries or regions as to how this structural shift occurred is also 
important as the pressures on the environment in general, and on forests in particular, may be 
transferred from one location to another. For example, to meet domestic and industrial 
demand for timber, logging pressures may be transferred from one country to the other for 
several reasons besides stock sufficiency (see Box 4). The price of timber in other regions, the 
weaknesses in institutional settings in forestry laws, and greater incentives to import wood, 
are just a few of these examples. It may not be surprising to note that all industrialized 
countries in Asia-Pacific are net importers of forest products (FAO 2005) and that China’s 
growth is accompanied by its aggressive increase in wood imports from other countries, even 
from the African region.  
 
Box 3. Regional Disparities in Growth and Transformation: The Case of “Two Indias” 
 
Differences in development outcomes in the various states in India is captured by the term “two 
Indias” which indicates the large disparity between the poorest seven with the richest seven states. 
The former, accounting for approximately 55% of the population in 2002-2003, had only two-thirds 
GDP per capita of the US4480 national average. The latter, on the other hand, accounted for 33% of 
the total population of the country but had a GDP per capita of 100% more than the former. More 
specifically, the two largest and poorest northern states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, with 25% of 
India’s total population, had only one third of Tamil Nadu’s GDP per capita in the same year. 
 
Bihar, like Uttar Pradesh, is an agriculture-based economy where the majority of the people (80%) 
rely on agriculture for subsistence and livelihoods. Agriculture plays also a major role in the 
economy, as 40% of GDP is generated through the sector. Tamil Nadu, on the other hand, 
considered urbanized according to the WB’s categorization, is one of India’s fastest growing states 
where manufacturing, ICT, and financial services serve as engines of growth.   
 
These disparities, however, are masked by national aggregate figures. While national aggregates 
indicate a partial structural transformation, this does not necessarily apply to all states. 
 
 *This narrative is largely based on Devarajan and Nabi (2006), WB (2007), and Sachs et al. (2001).   
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What is clear is that structural transformation in the economy, as well as economic growth, 
will have significant effects on forests and forestry. As indicated, these effects will vary 
across cases, and may either be positive or negative. Thus, there is limited value in arguing 
that higher incomes of countries and people, in the tradition of the EKC hypothesis, are 
prerequisites for improved forest condition, as different realities that accompany improved 
incomes may affect forest resources differently. In some cases, positive action on the part of 
the government will be necessary to generate the desired improvements in forest health. In 
others, significant variations in the macro-economic fundamentals of an economy are the 
defining variables that determine the fate of forests and forestry.  
 
Macro-economic variables and forests  
 
In an influential review of the causes of deforestation by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), 
they interposed that macro-economic level variables and policy instruments are the 
underlying causes of deforestation. However, how these variables and instruments affect 
forests, they argued, are dependent on the types of decisions that agents arrive at which 
consequently lead to the sources of deforestation directly impinging on forest health. They 
emphasized that the causation may not be unidirectional in as much as actions of agents may 
also correspondingly affect macro-economic level variables and policy instruments. In the 
following discussion, we take this view (see Figure 10), but apply it largely in the context of 
forests and forestry, and not only in deforestation. 
 
 
 
 
Box 4. Transferring Environmental Costs to Poorer Countries: Evidence from Asia-
Pacific 
 
In 1993, an OECD working paper argued, using pollution as a variable between Japan and 
Indonesia, that there is greater evidence on the asymmetric environmental effects of international 
trade that tended to transfer environmental costs from richer to poorer countries (Lee and Holst, 
1993). The same conclusion seems to have taken ground in recent years and especially in the context 
of timber trade within the region.   
 
Japan is the main importer of forest products from the Southeast Asian countries and is argued to 
have stimulated higher deforestation rates in the latter countries. Though trade is not the only cause 
for deforestation, it has been implicated to play an indirect role as “logging for export” soared in 
countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia that cleared forests to serve external 
demand, a significant portion of which comes from Japan. In Japan, however, forests flourished 
during this period (Seo and Taylor 2003). 
 
China has reported significant afforestation gains (FAO 2006) but the country has also been one of 
the largest importers of forest products in recent years. This is argued to have caused problems of 
deforestation, and unsustainable harvesting practices in supplier countries. One of the heavily 
impacted countries by this regional trade is Papua New Guinea, with logging intensity increasing 
and “concessionaires frequently exploiting areas of forests that are topographically unsuited for 
logging” (White et al. 2006). This trade is considered a direct threat to the nation’s forests that could 
have been used to further economic growth in the long run had they been managed well. 
 
In 1989, the government of Thailand banned logging and cancelled 300 logging concessions, part of 
its response to a catastrophic flood that caused the death of 350 people in the late 1980s. As an 
effect, Thai loggers, construction firms, and other industrial players turned to the neighboring 
countries for alternative sources. As a consequence, illegal logging within Thailand and illegal log 
trade with its neighbors increased so significantly that in 1992, Burma accounted for 70% of 
Thailand’s illegal imports (Dauvergne 2001).  
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Figure 10. Macro-economics and forests: a framework (adapted from Angelsen 
and Kaimowitz, 1999) 
 
Macro-economic variables and policy instruments will ultimately impact on forests, 
depending on how agents proximate to the forests arrive at decisions. These decisions are 
dependent on the kind of information agents have on markets, the types of technology 
available, the quality of infrastructure, and the strength of institutions existing in a given 
economy. Central to this decision making process however, are the role of incentives and 
constraints22 (Chomitz 2007) that would dictate what particular land or forest use will yield 
more economic benefit to agents, both at the macro and micro levels.  
 
This presupposes the fact that effects of macro-economic variables and policy instruments are 
contextual, since markets, technology, infrastructure, and institutions are different across 
countries. In which case, the argument that “local context shapes environmental and 
livelihood outcomes” (Chomitz 2007) is significant, in as much as contexts determine how 
agents act or react, notwithstanding the fact that macro-economic variables are products of 
decisions made by agents too, and policy implications in turn shape the local context.   
 
Agents (whether farmers, private corporations, or states) protect, maintain, or clear forests as 
a response to available incentives and constraints (Chomitz 2007). Incentives may be large or 
miniscule, but their absolute values do not matter when alternatives do not exist or when 
availability of cash for immediate needs is scarce. For example, illegal loggers may derive 
more benefits from forest clearing but a farmer, even when earning only very small amounts 
from extracting non-timber forest products will continue doing so in the absence of other 
income sources, or when current sources are not enough.   
 
In like manner, governments may allow extensive extraction of forest resources to meet 
domestic and export demands, corporations may opt not to invest in forest plantations as 
returns are not secured, or community organizations may advocate for forest protection when 
signs of water scarcity for their farms are felt. These are all responses to both incentives and 
constraints. It is important to note here, that incentives and constraints need not necessarily be 
economic, but social and cultural as well (see Box 5). 
 
                                                 
22 An incentive is anything that motivates or stimulates people to act (Giger 1999). While incentive is 
normally  used to denote an economic motivator, the term is used widely in this paper to include others 
that are created by social, moral, and cultural factors. Constraints, on the other hand are broadly defined 
in management theory as limitations in the achievement of a particular goal. 
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Incentives, however, are not independent in themselves. They are stimulated, largely in part, 
by other trends occurring in a given economy. For example, increased demand for cash crops 
attended with higher prices may shift crop preference of farmers, and may encourage 
conversion of forest land for this use. Road access is argued to increase the risks of 
deforestation as it has the effect of increasing farm gate prices of agricultural outputs and 
decreasing input prices, and thus, the greater incentive to clear land for agricultural use. In 
terms of economic incentives, however, relative changes in the macro-economy, either caused 
by unfolding trends or policy instruments initiated by governments, significantly alter 
incentive structures or create constraints that either promote or endanger forest health.   
 
In this case, it is important to define several terminologies as they are used in this paper. 
Macro-economic variables are segregated in this paper into two – macro-economic trends and 
policy instruments. Macro-economic trends refer to those variables that characterize the 
behavior of the aggregate economy. They consist of several significant trends like growth, 
employment, inflation, terms of trade, and price levels, among others. Policy instruments, on 
the other hand, largely refer to those decisions made by national governments to influence 
how a particular economy behaves, and in this paper, consist of several items such as 
agricultural subsidies, interest rates, taxation, wage rates, and exchange rates (see Figure 11).  
 
Policy instruments are part of macro-economic trends too, as they also reflect an economy’s 
behavior. They are particularly emphasized in the paper because these are the macro-
economic variables that governments tend to influence to yield or reverse a macro-economic 
trend. For example, governments may raise interest rates to abate inflation, impose taxes on 
imports to enhance competitiveness of domestic enterprises and decrease unemployment, or 
offer agricultural subsidies to achieve price stability of food crops and other agricultural 
products. 
 
Box 5. Demand for Forest Recreation in South Korea (Tak et al. 2007) 
 
The Republic of Korea is one of the world’s success stories in reforestation. The Japanese 
colonization (1910-1945) devastated the country’s landscape, the damage of which was further 
exacerbated by the Korean War (1950-1953). The country was unable to rehabilitate the severely 
denuded forests not until a “stable democracy and increasing economic prosperity” allowed the state 
to focus on “reforesting the nation”. To date, 65% of the country’s land area is classified as 
forestland. 
 
However, only 5-8% of the country’s wood consumption is supplied by its dense forests despite the 
fact that 70% of it are private forestlands. Only 22.6% of private landowners use their forests for 
commercial timber production. Consequently, demand for domestic consumption is satisfied through 
importation, also brought about by the fact that domestic timber is more expensive due to high labor 
costs and steep terrain. 
 
South Korea is one of the world’s most densely populated countries, with half of its 48 million 
people living in the city of Seoul. Several factors such as “dense urban living, increasing per capita 
income, and the recent national conversion to a five-day work week from six” caused an increased 
demand for forest recreation. 
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Figure 11. Policy instruments and trends 
 
Policy instruments also have a relative life, as they cannot be imposed forever without 
dangerous repercussions. For example, a country cannot forever peg its currency on a fixed 
rate as this may cause a major drawback in growth as it may heighten inflation. Also, 
governments do not have the unrestricted control over policy instruments as they may pose 
dangers to the economy. Interest rates, for example, may be increased or decreased in a given 
period but can never go beyond or below a certain range, or it will largely be disastrous to 
either growth or economic welfare.   
 
Nevertheless, certain policy instruments can establish long-term trends despite their relative 
short-term intention. For example, government intervention in wage rates through the setting 
up of minimum wages may set a trend in wage rates which the employing sector may no 
longer have the power to control. In this case, wages may normally have an upward trend with 
every significant change in the economy. An example of this is when a slight movement in 
the oil price will cause a demand from the labor sector for wage rate increases. 
 
The linkages between macro-economic variables and forests are explored below. In most 
cases, the arguments are positioned theoretically, rather than empirically, as some variables 
face the challenge of inadequacy of both empirical and theoretical research especially in 
exploring the variable-forestry connection. A general assessment of the effects of the different 
variables on forests and forestry is not plausible as there are other factors that need to be 
considered in arriving at a particular generalization. Thus, most arguments in this section will 
be made in ceteris paribus23 and will largely be concentrated on a particular sector or sub-
sector of the economy and not necessarily on its totality.   
 
Interest rates 
 
Interest rates and exchange rates are two distinct and highly volatile tools that governments 
use in order to manage supply of money in an economy or control trading in foreign exchange 
markets. The monetary policy of the government largely influences how it sets interest rates –
whether it is expansionary or contractionary. For example, if a government projects an 
imminent inflation caused by a surplus of currency in circulation, it may increase interest 
rates to discourage further spending and consumption and encourage savings, thus, siphoning 
out excess money from circulation (hence, contractionary).24 
                                                 
23 The assumption, “all other things being equal”, does not hold value when applied in reality, as the 
world does not operate in the same kind of logic. However, to assess the linkages, it is necessary to do 
so to be able to explore the probable links and to avoid getting entangled in a web of complex 
causations that would preclude the meaningful understanding of concepts. 
24 In so far as monetary policy is concerned, interest rates are positive actions or reactions on the part of 
the government to provide equilibrium between the demand and supply of money, as it controls the 
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Interest rates affect a country’s economy in several ways, but in most obvious terms, they 
affect the economy indirectly and through two channels – investment and consumption 
decisions. For example, changes in interest rates affect investment decisions of both 
businesses and consumers as they try to identify the appropriate behavior that will generate 
the most yield and the least risks.25 If interest rates increase, businesses will most likely 
withhold physical investments as the cost of funding them becomes increasingly high and also 
because increase in interest rates signals a degree of uncertainty. Businesses would rather save 
money for which returns are high and reasonably assured than put money in expansion or 
intensification in which returns are still contingent and which also require significant 
borrowing. The same is true for consumers who will have the tendency to save rather than 
spend and defer credit acquisition. Those with outstanding debt obligations will have lesser 
disposable income to spend as interest payments increase. In effect, domestic consumption 
will dampen causing a decrease in domestic demand.26 
 
The reaction of business and people to changes in interest rates however, is varied. Interest 
rate-sensitive industries such as construction, automobiles, and capital goods may normally 
suspend investment in operations faster than others, while households with high credit-
intensity may also depress consumption quicker. As such, a drastic decline in consumption in 
investment is least likely and an immediate fall in aggregate demand therefore may not occur. 
Governments on the other hand, are not spared from this trend, as higher interest rates would 
cause a drain in public funds when domestic borrowing is high. This will normally create an 
expectation of higher taxes as government needs to recover funds lost in interest payments 
and may also further the decline in investments. 
 
How will this analysis extend to forests? 
 
An increase in interest rates may be assumed to positively affect forests in a variety of ways. 
For example, large-scale urbanization programs, agricultural plantation investments, and other 
capital-intensive projects that have the potential to impinge on forest resources will most 
likely be deferred when real interest rates increase as this would affect total profitability of 
investments due to rising interest costs. This argument is assumed under the premise that 
capital is provided domestically rather than internationally, as the latter would render less 
support for the argument. Another effect may be that domestic consumption will experience 
downward pressures as interest rates increase, thus indicating less demand for agricultural and 
forest products for both domestic and industrial consumption, and therefore lesser pressure for 
agricultural expansion or forest wood extraction. Again, this is assumed to occur under the 
condition that external demand will not absorb local demand deficits.   
 
However, when interest rate increase causes a halt in investments and a long run squeeze on 
domestic demand, this will likely cause temporary, if not permanent closures of some 
industrial players and a significant lay-off of workers, who may turn to agriculture and natural 
resources for livelihood. Also, when interest rates, though high, are still below returns on 
                                                                                                                                            
latter part of the equation. When demand for money is high, stroked by excessive growth in wages, 
increased lending activities, and overoptimistic expectations on the economy attracting large inflows of 
investments, governments most likely increase interest rates. 
25 While consumers react to increases of both nominal and real interest rates, only real after-tax interest 
rates are crucial to the decision making processes of businesses. Nominal interest rate is that which is 
set by the Central Bank and which later on influences bank rates while real interest rate is the nominal 
interest rate less inflation rate. Unless otherwise stated, interest rates in the discussion would mean 
nominal interest rates. 
26 It is important to note here that household spending and business investment do not react quickly to 
higher interest rates. A “time lag” normally occurs before the change in interest rates can finally affect 
the general economy. 
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investments of particular capital intensive ventures that would affect forests, then the previous 
argument that forests will be aided will not be held true.   
 
These interpretations, however, will become increasingly arguable, when set in a context of 
volatile real and nominal interest rates. Under the “time lag assumption”, the effects of 
interest rate changes will likely penetrate macro-economic conditions within a year or more, 
and given the fact that governments balance out their finances and set interest rates regularly 
to deal with inflationary variables, the effects will be hardly noticeable. Thus, agents’ 
behavior, more particularly those with business interests, will be affected only when interest 
rates are projected to remain slightly constant in medium to long terms especially in 
developing countries where investments are seen to be infrequently sensitive to interest rate 
movements.  
 
More so, with globalized capital flows, increase in interest rates in one country may not 
discourage investment of external capital when the changes in the host country’s interest rates 
cannot outweigh the positive benefits derived from cheap labor and taxation incentives that it 
offers. As such, even when interest rates increase, the projected effect on investments will not 
probably materialize. 
 
Exchange rates27 
 
As earlier mentioned, the other influential, yet highly volatile policy tool that countries use to 
hedge against economic imbalances is exchange rate. The most critical aspect here is the type 
of exchange rate regime a country employs in managing its economy as this would determine 
how exchange rate will likely change over time.28 In the countries of Emerging Asia, most 
currencies are on a managed float except China that has its currency on a crawling peg, while 
the industrialized economies are on independent float regimes. The other economies vary 
largely – ranging from hard peg (e.g. Brunei) to fixed managed floats (e.g. Bangladesh).29   
 
China’s currency regime has been under much debate in recent years, leaving several 
economist and lawmakers in the US in agitation, as the country is the fingered culprit in the 
persisting US trade deficit. The yuan was claimed to be so undervalued that it provided a 
covert subsidy on the country’s exports, effectively taxing US consumers and harming the 
competitiveness of its firms. There is little agreement however, on these charges, and in 2005, 
both the US Treasury and the IMF absolved the country of manipulating its currency to gain 
unfair advantage (Hanke and Connoly 2005; Hughes 2005). But the China Currency Coalition, 
an alliance of different stakeholders to “support US manufacturing by seeking an end to 
Chinese currency manipulation” still maintains that the yuan, since 2005, has appreciated by 
                                                 
27 Like interest rates, exchange rates can also either be nominal or real. Nominal exchange rate refers to 
that which is established on currency financial markets while real exchange rate refers to nominal rate 
less adjustment for inflation. The paper uses the nominal exchange rate concept when mentioning 
exchange rate, unless otherwise stated. 
28  An exchange rate regime defines how a local currency is expected to behave against foreign 
currencies. A floating currency regime, for example, allows the free movement of the local currency 
value as market forces change (an independent float) or allows some form of government intervention 
(a managed float). The opposite of this would be a pegged currency, where a currency is tied to another 
currency at a fixed or periodically adjusted rate. There are many variations in this case – pegged rate in 
a horizontal band (where the currency is allowed fluctuations within a fixed band around a central rate, 
rates within a crawling band (where a currency is also allowed to fluctuate in a band around a central 
value which is revised periodically), or a crawling peg where the rate is fixed but is adjusted 
periodically. The extreme form is a hard peg, also referred to as a currency board or fixed regime that 
assumes a direct convertibility of a local currency to another foreign currency/basket of foreign 
currencies, where the latter’s value determines the fluctuations in the former. 
29  For most recent classification of exchange rate systems, see Fischer’s (2007) “Exchange Rate 
Systems, Surveillance, and Advice”. 
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40% in real terms, which China contains by continuing to insist on the current exchange rate 
regime (CCC 2007). 
 
Even when these charges are not true, global pressures especially coming from the US bloc 
may still insist on revaluing the yuan more, though its value has since appreciated since 2005. 
But why is China reluctant, if not adamant, to yield to US demands? 
 
The presumed effect of currency revaluation is generally harmful to the economy through 
investment, trade, credit, production, and consumption routes, especially when the 
appreciation is substantial. Currency appreciation may negatively affect the export 
competitiveness of a country as its products will become more expensive compared to other 
sources30 so that transference of importer preference from one country to another will most 
likely occur. For example, the increasing value of the baht is currently causing the fear that 
the Thai economy will suffer significant losses in its export trade (Fernquest 2008). The same 
trend is affecting India as the rupee’s value has risen significantly against the dollar (The 
Economist 13 December 2007). 
 
Currency appreciation may also adversely affect foreign direct investments in export-oriented 
businesses in one country, as its attractiveness to global financial capital will decrease to 
benefit other countries. If another country’s currency is weaker, but possesses more or less the 
same variables that constitute a favorable investment climate, capital would normally transfer 
to that country where returns will be significantly higher (see Box 6). Domestic investments 
too will be affected, especially when capital sources of domestic firms are from internal funds. 
The cost of expansion and large physical capital accumulations will become more costly as 
currencies appreciate.    
 
When this happens simultaneously, this will create economic stress on the country that 
decided to appreciate the currency. It will negatively affect growth as investments and exports 
will decline. Consequently, it will cause significant increases in unemployment and result in 
less capacity to pay loans. While it is assumed that when the currency appreciates, the buying 
power of consumers will increase and will thus stimulate demand, this effect will be 
dampened by the unemployment effect mentioned above.  
 
These scenarios will have significant implications on forests and forestry in both medium and 
long terms. Forests will be negatively affected when currency appreciates, as the ongoing 
process of structural transformation of the economy will slow down, and the increased 
number of unemployed people will cause significant reversals to agriculture.   
 
                                                 
30 This effect is assumed under the condition that export sales are denominated in the currency of the 
importing country. 
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Conversely, however, significant devaluation of currencies is also detrimental to the economy 
through the same channels that revaluation affects it. Though initially, devaluation will boost 
the export competitiveness of a country, it will nevertheless increase production costs when a 
significant amount of the inputs are outsourced. Also, this may damage domestic enterprises 
when capital comes from international markets, as the burden of repayment will increase.  
 
In a study correlating macro-economic fundamentals with forests, Capistrano and Kiker (1995) 
argued that currency devaluation is harmful to forests for two reasons. First, currency 
devaluation makes agriculture more competitive so that the opportunity cost of keeping the 
land under forest cover increases. Secondly, currency devaluation enhances the 
competitiveness of forest product exports that can encourage increased wood harvesting. 
However, the greatest risk that a devaluation of foreign currency may pose to an economy and 
to forests is inflation, which shall be dealt with separately.  
 
Inflation 
 
Inflation is a condition where above-normal increases in the general prices of goods and 
services in the economy occur as money supply grows without a corresponding increase in 
production. Inflation can be caused by several factors but more notably by an increase in 
Box 6. Revaluing the Yuan: What Impact on Wood Product Trade in the 
Region? 
 
China’s competitive advantage as a low cost manufacturer of wood products resulted in a 
widespread relocation of investments in the sector to the country and away from the western 
economies. This phenomenon is set against a backdrop of increased trade in wood-based products 
(sawn timber, wood pulp, paper, board, and wood-based panels) that was phenomenal especially 
in the context of wood-based panel trade (800% increase in the last 30 years). Corresponding to 
China’s emergence as an economic powerhouse, its domestic demand for timber as well as pulp 
and paper products has also increased dramatically in recent years. Currently, China is the 
region’s largest importer of logs, surpassing both Japan and South Korea, to satisfy both 
industrial and consumer demand. 
 
Strengthening the value of the yuan would potentially affect the export competitiveness of China 
as Vietnam, reportedly the country with the lowest wage rates in the wood product industry in the 
region, is currently the most competitive country in the sector. It has to be noted here that rivalry 
within the industry and even among nations is stiff as most compete for similar market segments 
and with similar products. An appreciation of the yuan’s value, even at the conservative estimate 
of 15%, will most likely tilt the balance in favor of Vietnam or Malaysia, a close third to China’s 
second rank in the industry’s competitiveness index. Consequently, this will lead to the likely 
transfer of production activities from the country to others in the region. With an optimistic 
economic outlook for both Vietnam and Malaysia, this scenario will be likely. 
 
However, domestic demand in China will also surge as purchasing power of people increases and 
the propensity to import will correspondingly increase as well. Also, the current production 
capacity is still insufficient to meet global wood products demand. With an increased currency 
relative to others in the region, China has the capacity to import more wood for both consumption 
and production, and given the relative inelasticity of wood supply, may exert import advantage 
especially with its major source, the Russian Federation. China too will be able to take advantage 
of economies of scale compared to the other two countries, and will likely compensate losses in 
labor costs with reduction to the gains in capital, leaving net gain and competitiveness barely 
unchanged. 
 
Regional and global trade, however, will still be on an upswing, given the booming construction 
sector in the region’s economies and in the continuing construction expansion in the Middle East. 
What will most likely happen is a restructuring of the product trade and the increased competition 
in the industry between countries. 
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aggregate demand due to a surge in public and private spending or the decline in total supply 
due to increased production costs. Inflation hurts the economy because it affects both 
consumption and investment significantly. In most cases, people will have a negative attitude 
towards savings because the value of money decreases, thereby restricting the supply of 
money that can be used to finance investments. As prices also increase, the cost of investing 
in productive enterprises will normally surge, and thus diminish investment growth.   
 
In a highly inflationary economic environment, it is the fixed income earners that will be hurt 
the most, as their revenues will not adjust easily as prices increase. The behavior of agents, 
both private and public, will be largely affected, often leading to depressed consumption. The 
normal reaction, more particularly for workers in societies where labor organizations are 
adequately sophisticated, is to demand for increase in wages, causing a strain on production 
costs of entrepreneurs and in extreme cases creating labor unrest that may discourage further 
investment and even create pressures for industries to close as both labor and materials 
become more costly. Hence, persisting inflation may lead not only to dwindling domestic 
demand, but also to high rates of unemployment, more particularly for the service and 
industrial sectors, because of both the pressures on investment on the one side and the demand 
for wages on the other. 
 
When an economy starts to show inflationary signals, governments usually raise interest rates 
to restrict monetary growth and encourage savings. When this is done however, it also 
dampens growth, as indicated in the earlier section on interest rates. In some cases, 
governments exercise fiscal austerity to the detriment of public service and poverty reduction 
programs benefiting the poor, and even investments in forest conservation while others cut 
back on oil importation that also restrict growth for oil-intensive countries. Thus, 
governments try to contain inflation as much as possible to refrain from implementing policy 
measures that are nevertheless destructive to economic stability and growth.   
 
Based on the foregoing information, inflation may have different effects on forestry. Inflation, 
in so far as it encourages consumption at its initial stages, will create greater demand for food 
and other products. This may be responded to by the agricultural sector participants through 
increased land cultivation and expansion as they too suffer the need to earn more to be able to 
afford basic consumption goods. Also, as money for investments becomes scarce, it may 
restrict the expansion of the service and industrial sector, and even cause massive 
unemployment, causing a halt to the structural transformation of the economy as well as 
creating more pressures on land and resources in the absence of social safety nets. It may be 
argued however, that agricultural investments may also experience a sharp decline since farm 
inputs will also become more expensive, which can also put more strain on forests and natural 
resources as resource extraction to compensate for declining agricultural revenue is a likely 
outcome. 
 
Given this, a cycle towards poverty phases such as in people with decreased incomes will 
depress consumption, and business with low domestic demand and increasing production 
costs will be forced to shut down operations, either temporarily or permanently. This will 
create massive unemployment, leading to more decline in demand, and causing further 
unemployment. An inflow of foreign capital may also decline abruptly because of the 
increased production costs and the declining competitiveness of the investment climate 
compared to other countries.   
 
Again, the picture is made more complex by a highly globalized environment. Very recently, 
there is the fear that the inflationary tendencies of China are currently being exported to other 
countries through trade channels. In the last five years, China was believed to have helped 
reduce global inflation through its cheap imports but now, analysts feared that this is no 
longer the case, as the cost of living in the country has sharply increased in the last year (The 
Economist, 2 August 2007; International Herald Tribune, 9 January 2008). Fears that China 
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will stroke inflation at a global scale have been brought to attention in both policy and 
academic discourse due to the rising value of the yuan accompanied by a significant increase 
in the country’s consumer price index. If this apprehension can be found to have a substantial 
basis and will likely materialize, this will have an effect on both global and regional trade, and 
the individual economies of the Asia-Pacific countries.  
 
Taxation policies and incentives 
 
Taxation is considered the lifeblood of governments as it is their primary source of revenue. 
Apart from providing governments with revenue, however, taxes are used as major policy 
tools more particularly in enforcing regulation (e.g. when governments would like to 
discourage a particular behavior, or the goods relating to it are taxed), in achieving equitable 
distribution of wealth (e.g. in progressive taxations systems where tax is levied on the ability 
of an individual to pay, governments can extract taxes from the rich and correspondingly fund 
social programs for the poor) and even in spurring economic growth (e.g. governments grant 
tax exemptions to private investors to encourage them to invest in particular enterprises that 
are crucial to economic development). 
 
Taxes are viewed as effective tools in influencing macro- and micro-economic impacts. In the 
macro sphere, taxes were able to influence where, when, and what to invest in (Howard 1997) 
through the grant of tax incentives either as reductions or exemptions, tax holidays, and tax 
free regions or zones. In the micro level, taxes are used to influence consumer behavior, like 
the imposition of higher taxes for tobacco and liquor or modifying the tax structure of certain 
money instruments to encourage particular forms of savings and investments. There is little 
agreement however, as to whether taxes improve or deter economic performance and what 
types of taxes have the capacity to do so. 
 
There are many forms of taxation instruments used by governments and their effects on the 
economy may be varied in different settings. For example, value added tax will normally 
increase prices of goods so that it may discourage consumption of luxury goods but not 
essential commodities. High tariffs on imports may positively affect local producers in terms 
of competitiveness but only when their production is also not import-intensive. Given this 
variety, this subsection will only focus on one distinct taxation instrument – corporate income 
tax. 
 
Low corporate income taxes and income tax incentives are argued to positively affect the 
inflow of foreign direct investments only when the “fixed locational characteristics”, like 
political and economic stability or transport and infrastructure costs are more or less the same 
(Morisset and Pirnia 2001). In which case, given similar political economic conditions of 
countries in the Asian region for example, a slight upward movement in corporate taxes, or 
more favorable incentive offers, will normally influence global physical capital decisions. It is 
to be noted here, that tax incentives too, when directed at domestic corporations, can spur 
additional entrepreneurial activity that will help improve the economy. 
 
But the type of tax incentive offered will also influence the kind of capital that comes in, in 
the absence of a relevant regulatory mechanism. For example, the tax holiday,31 the most 
common form of tax incentive that developing countries offer to foreign investors, may 
increase FDI but not on relatively fixed and long-term industries, but on mobile companies 
that can disappear in one and appear in another location easily. In which case, the type of 
economic activity invited is very volatile and may generate short-lived and minimal benefits 
in net terms. Hence, when tax competition between economies exists, this will result in “a 
race towards the bottom” and may prove harmful to competing economies.  
 
                                                 
31 A tax holiday is a temporary reduction or elimination of a particular tax. 
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Assuming tax incentives can generate sufficient non-migratory capital to fund specific 
industries in countries, there will be no unilinear effect that can be established in so far as 
forests are concerned. For example, if FDI will engage in labor-intensive industries that can 
attract employment from the agricultural sector, tax incentives may likely impact positively 
on forests as migration from agriculture to service and industrial sectors will be likely. But a 
different scenario will occur when FDI is directed at agricultural plantations, for example, that 
may escalate forest clearing in the absence of effective regulations. Thus, tax incentives can 
only be forest-friendly, when they are designed to attract investments that do not increase 
pressure on land and forests or when they do, effective institutional arrangements are in place 
to mitigate, if not avoid their impact. More importantly, tax incentives can work positively, 
when this is directed at industries that would enhance wood supply sustainability while at the 
same time creating jobs for people in the localities (see Box 7).   
 
Agricultural subsidies  
 
Agricultural subsidies take many forms but the most common is that of an economic transfer 
from governments to the farmers – either to reduce the cost of production (e.g. subsidizing 
fertilizer costs) or to increase the price of the output (e.g. buying agricultural products at a 
guaranteed price). Governments have various reasons in offering agricultural subsidies to 
farmers, but most of these are intended to support farm income and achieve price stabilization 
of farm products (Lingard 2001) either as a way of promoting or stabilizing the agricultural 
sector. 
 
Box 7. Can Tax Incentives Stimulate Better Forest Management Systems in 
Malaysia? 
 
The declining wood supply in Malaysia has prompted its government to adopt drastic and aggressive 
measures to encourage private investment in forest plantation development. The National Committee 
on Forest Plantation and Development was formally created in April 1992 to “formulate a national 
strategy and action plan for the promotion and effective implementation of forest plantation 
programs”. 
 
Central to the country’s strategy in attracting investment to the sector is the use of fiscal incentives. In 
1993, the government granted full tax exemption for five to ten years to private investors undertaking 
forest plantation establishment. Six years after, additional incentives were granted in the form of tax 
credits, where companies undertaking forest plantation establishment were allowed to offset 
qualifying capital expenditures (e.g. clearing and preparation of land, planting of timber seedlings, 
provision of plant and machinery, building of access roads and bridges, amongst others) against 
corporate income from other business sources. In 2003, further tax credits were granted as companies 
were allowed to reduce tax burden by offsetting their losses from profits of another company within 
the same group and expanding the list of allowable pre-operating activities that can be deducted from 
taxable income. Also, a special purpose facility, the Forest Plantation Development Sdn Bhd was 
formed very recently to “disburse soft loans for private companies willing to establish forest 
plantations. 
 
Has this generated the desired results so far? 
 
There is a slow and marginal uptake on the part of the private sector to engage in forest plantations 
since the time incentives were offered because of the high initial capital that forest plantations require. 
Without sufficient low-cost capital, investors will likely engage in other ventures where returns on 
capital are greater and the payback period is shorter. The effect of the recent initiative on forest 
plantation financing still remains to be seen. 
 
Sources: Thang, forthcoming; Ismail et al. (2007). 
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The conventional wisdom is that agricultural subsidies will promote agricultural expansion, 
thus threatening the fate of forests. When the cost of raw material to support production has 
been reduced due to the subsidy and inexpensive labor is available, even areas less conducive 
to farming (e.g. steep slopes) are converted to agriculture. This can be further accentuated 
when agricultural prices increase relative to other products. In countries and communities 
where agriculture is the main livelihood, even when agricultural prices increase together with 
other products, agricultural expansion will still be a likely outcome. 
 
This argument calls for a policy interpretation that agricultural subsidies are inefficient and 
thus must be removed. But removal of subsidies need not necessarily be a solution. In some 
cases, the removal of subsidies is compensated by more extensive use of land. This happens 
because agricultural material input becomes so costly that its downward pressure on farm 
profit is compensated by increasing land use, assuming labor is cheap and available. 
 
These arguments hold true and become increasingly relevant under certain circumstances. 
First, they operate positively when an economy is characterized by the relative high 
importance of agriculture as an income generator for the majority of its population and when 
other economic sectors are unable to absorb livelihood demands and opportunities to engage 
in the unorganized non-agricultural activities are slim. Second, expansion also deepens when 
technology that increases yields is made available and labor or capital requirements remain 
the same or decrease (Southgate 1990). Third, when agricultural labor is cheap and available 
and farmers have access to farm credit, expansion becomes more likely. Finally, when prices 
of agricultural products increase, given the conditions above, agricultural expansion that 
would encroach on forest land is a likely outcome even when other prices of products would 
increase. All these arguments however presume that farmers can easily access agricultural 
subsidies. 
 
It is to be noted however, that small individual farmers are not the only culprits to the 
expansion of agriculture that encroached on the region’s forests. Rich farmers and big 
agricultural corporations are more capable and positioned to invest in agricultural expansion 
than small individual farm holders (WB 2007). The current trend in agricultural plantations in 
some countries in the region cleared more natural forests alongside the effects of shifting 
cultivation (see Box 8). 
 
 
 
 
Box 8. Replacing Indonesia’s Forests  
 
“Indonesia is experiencing the biggest rate of increase in terms of forests converted into oil palm 
plantations. In a period of 30 years (1967-1997) oil palm plantations have increased 20 times with 
12 percent average annual increases in crude palm oil (CPO) production.” 
 
“From 106,000 hectares in 1960 this has increased to 6 million hectares although there were around 
18 million hectares of forests cleared purportedly for oil palm in 2006. It appears that loggers used 
oil palm plantations as a justification to harvest the timber.”  
 
“The government announced new plans, under the Kalimantan Border Oil Palm Mega-Project (April 
2006), to convert an additional 3 million hectares in Borneo, of which 2 million will be in the border 
of Kalimantan and Malaysia.”  
 
“Clearly, the main reason for the dramatic expansion of oil palm plantations, notwithstanding their 
adverse impacts on people and the environment, is that these provide big profits to domestic and 
international plantation owners and investors.” 
 
Tauli-Corpuz and Tamang (2007). 
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Changes in wage rates 
 
Changes in wage rates have varying effects on forests that are important to distinguish 
between changes in farm wages from off-farm wages. Increase in farm wages, for example, is 
assumed to be likely beneficial to forests as it would make labor-intensive agricultural and 
forestry activities more costly, and thus preclude clearing more land. This argument, however, 
is not conclusive for several reasons.   
 
For one, when increase in farm wages is part of the rising wages of a given economy, then the 
assumed effect on forestry will not materialize. Also, when increase in farm wages will 
happen in a non labor-intensive agricultural activity, this will not necessarily result in reduced 
pressures for land conversion. Increase in farm wages will also spur increased demand for 
food and agricultural products, and thus more pressures on agriculture to expand. More 
importantly, increase in farm and rural wages may also be a cause for forest deterioration, as 
forest management also becomes more costly. This phenomenon has shown its initial signs in 
the developed countries of the region (see Box 9). 
 
It is important to note here that in most rural communities in the region, farmers are not paid 
daily wages, but are cultivating their own land, are paid under tenancy arrangements, or hired 
on an irregular basis. In the first and second cases, farmers’ wages are not monetized and not 
factored as production cost, and thus becomes irrelevant as a decision parameter, unless 
family labor is scarce and the farm holder or the tenant has to resort to hiring farm workers. In 
the third case, increase in farm wages may prompt farm holders to concentrate more on their 
existing farms rather than using labor to clear other areas.  
 
Conversely, increase in off-farm wages relative to agriculture may be beneficial to forests as 
labor is assumed to move to the more productive sectors. As opportunities for off-farm 
employment become more lucrative, the incentive to use forest for employment – either by 
cultivating crops or cutting timber – will decrease (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999), and thus 
generating preconditions for agricultural expansion and timber extraction to halt. Still, this 
may also stroke domestic demand for food and agricultural products, thereby accentuating the 
need to increase food production, and thus agricultural expansion.   
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With the increasing globalization of labour and capital, the links between off-farm wage rates 
and forest health may become more complex. An increase in off-farm wages in one country 
relative to others may affect its competitive advantage so that companies will move 
production elsewhere where labor costs are predictable and cheap or substitute capital for 
labor by acquiring inputs elsewhere. When this happens, this country will face a problem of 
drastic unemployment, and when opportunities to engage in the informal sector are minimal, 
people will most likely revert to agriculture and to the natural resource base for livelihood.  
 
Agricultural prices and the biofuel phenomenon 
 
There is substantial evidence that increase in agricultural prices relative to others will 
negatively impact on forests as it will create more incentive for land clearing to increase 
agricultural production (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999). The only exception to this is when 
subsistence behavior, rather than profit maximization, is assumed on the part of farmers; 
when they reach a certain minimum consumption level, they will opt for leisure than more 
production (ibid.). 
 
The current trend on bio-fuels, as an alternative to fossil fuel as a source of energy, has 
brought back agriculture into the agenda because cultivation of crops for energy – corn, 
sugarcane, cassava, palm oil, among others – may become increasingly important to the 
economy. Thailand, for example, started to implement mandatory use of biodiesel (a mixture 
of 2% palm oil and 98% petroleum diesel) in February 2008 that caused fears that cooking oil 
manufacturers may experience scarcity of palm oil supply (Bangkok Post, 14 January 2008). 
Box 9. Challenging Conventional Wisdom 3: Japan’s Deteriorating Forests 
 
Japan is among the world’s top income-rich countries. If proponents of the Ecological 
Modernization Theory were right, Japan’s forest conditions would have become better over time, 
since reliance on the natural resource base has decreased, improvements in energy efficiency have 
lessened pressures on natural resources, and people have demanded more esthetic and environmental 
services from forests. But why have the forests of Japan deteriorated in recent years (see Table 4)?  
 
Japan started to regularly import wood, more particularly from its Southeast Asian neighbors, in the 
1960s. Japan enjoyed the benefit of low prices of timber as a consequence of this trade as Southeast 
Asian nations have depressed timber prices even in recent years. As imports increase, utilization of 
domestic wood fell as demand also decreased significantly. As an effect, price of domestic wood 
declined. 
 
In 1960, a cubic metre of cedar could feed 12 persons in a day. In 2000, the ratio declined to 1:1. 
This situation made it economically impractical for forest owners to keep their forests in good 
condition and led to the conversion of some to other uses, more particularly recreation. Between 
1986-1995, 100,000 hectares were converted to other uses; roughly 50% as golf courses.   
 
Also, the labor productivity of Japanese forestry has not improved significantly, because “Japan’s 
forests are primarily found on steep slopes in which mechanization is difficult”. As a result, 
“forestry workers have been driven out of that nation’s forests” as other employment options are 
more profitable. As a consequence, many forests in the country became completely unmanaged. The 
Japan Forest Agency in 1998 reported that culling, a process done to prevent trees to become too 
dense and obstruct each others’ growth, is done “in only half of the secondary forests which require 
it”. 
 
Thus, Japan’s most serious ongoing forestry problem is the “lack of management of privately owned 
forests” – the “underutilization and the corresponding absence of forest management”. 
 
*This narrative is largely based on Sean and Taylor (2002) and Japan Institute for Labour Policy and 
Training (2005).  
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On the other hand, increases in the prices of agricultural products in China last year were 
believed to have been caused by a growing interest in biofuels so that corn, a key source of 
bioenergy, created the upscale movement of the prices of farm products (The Beijing Review, 
14 September 2007). 
 
This trend in the region will cause an upward pull on food prices “either through increased 
competition for inputs such as land, water, fertilizer, and labour, or through international 
trade” (Kinlay and Dawe forthcoming). The International Food Policy Research Institute 
(Rosengrant et al. 2006) projects that feed stock crops (e.g. cassava, maize, oilseeds and 
wheat) and sugar, also significant food crops, will experience increased prices between 11%-
72% in 2020, depending on whether the development of the biofuel industry will be moderate 
or drastic. These projections will significantly affect forests in the region.   
 
It may cause “possible dispossession of land among the poor in areas with insecure land 
tenure” (Karekezi and Kithyoma 2006) resulting to poverty and food insecurity, assuming that 
the poor will not be absorbed as unskilled labor in the energy plantations. This can cause 
encroachment on forest frontiers because farmers will need land to compensate for livelihood 
loss. Also, in the absence of a clear regulatory framework and capacity to implement laws on 
land use, there is a likely possibility that significant amount of land, even that classified as 
forest land, may be converted to farms both by small and capitalist farmers, as a market 
mechanism response to increasing demand and prices of biofuel crops. 
 
Competing land uses, undoubtedly a major effect of this trend, will put more pressures too on 
forests as the need to clear land for energy plantations becomes profitable. This is further 
accentuated by commitment of governments to increase use of biofuels in energy 
consumption, as well as in the establishment of plantations (see Table 5). If these 
developments will materialize the effect on food prices, as well as its attendant consequence 
on forests, is a likely possibility.     
 
Table 5. Bio-fuel use and plantation commitments  
Country Bio-fuel use commitments Bio-energy plantation 
targets (excluding current) 
India 5% bioethanol – medium term 
10% – long term 
11.2 million hectares for 
jatropha by 2012 
Indonesia 2% from 2005 to 2010 3 million hectares for palm oil 
1.5. million hectares for 
jatropha 
1.5 million hectares for 
cassava 
Malaysia 5% for transport and industrial 
sectors 
- - -  
Thailand 2% by 2008 
10% by 2012 
750,000 hectares for palm oil 
by 2012 
Philippines 1% bio-diesel in 2006  
2% by 2008- 
5% by 2010 
10% by 2012 and onwards 
700,000 hectares for jatropha 
Source: Kinlay and Dawe, forthcoming  
 
We have to note here, that the growing interest in biofuel is only one of the many causes for 
increased food prices. The Global Food Outlook 2007 prepared by FAO lists several other 
variables that caused an upward push in the prices of farm products – tightness of supply in 
production in the midst of increasing demand and increase in the price of oil that caused an 
increase in production and freight costs. The EIU reports that rise in energy and transport 
costs will fuel inflation in agricultural prices that will result in significant increases in the 
prices of rice (from US$329 per tonne in 2007 to US$360 per tonne in 2011), soybeans (from 
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US$336 per tonne in 2007 to US$400 per tonne in 2011), and maize (US$16 per tonne in 
2007 to US$205 per tonne in 2011). Also, it was reported that demand for meat in China and 
India, two of the region’s most populous countries, increased significantly which caused an 
upward stir in both price and quantity demanded for cereals to feed animals (The Economist, 
6 December 2007).   
 
Persuasive evidence or loose connections? 
 
Interrogating the link between macro-economic trends and forestry is a complicated and 
daunting task. Several studies explore the link between macro-economic variables and 
deforestation, thereby tilting the argument in the negative direction (e.g. Wunder and Verbist 
2003) while others conclude, using the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)32 argument, that 
higher income is a necessary prerequisite for improved forest condition (e.g. Ehrhardt-
Martinez et al. 2002). In recent years, several studies point to the concept of ‘forest transition’ 
anchored on significant changes in land use (e.g. Rudel et al. 2005) to explain the different 
resulting cases when economic development is correlated with forest health. 
 
However, there is still little agreement on these assumptions. Despite generalizations made, 
there are still significant variations in some cases, lending to the argument that the links are 
contextual rather than general. Even the effect of macro-economic variables on the overall 
performance of the economy is still a highly debated topic that yields several interpretations 
and policy prescriptions. Thus, the more difficulty there is, especially when these variables 
are linked to the health of a country’s forests, given the fact that causation is entirely covert 
and complex. 
 
What this section has attempted to do is to explore the links between macro-economic trends 
and forests in order to shed some understanding on why certain decisions affect forests in a 
certain way. While the analyses are not conclusive, and in some cases ambiguous, there are 
three certain points that it tries to make. 
 
First, the behavior of agents in the economy is the ultimate driver in the changes in forests and 
forestry. These agents can be proximate to forests, and thus, their actions directly impinge on 
forest health and condition. But they too can be remote from forests but whose decisions, in 
the form of macroeconomic policies, establish or change the whole context where all others in 
a particular economy act and react on. Second, echoing the World Bank’s argument, 
incentives and constraints are the deciding factors that influence the behavior of agents. These 
incentives and constraints, shaped also by agents, determine whether agents will maintain, 
grow, conserve, or clear forests. Finally, and because of the arguments mentioned above, the 
same macro-economic variables affect forests differently, so a generalization is difficult and 
only a theoretical indication is likely. 
                                                 
32 The EKC, an environmental analog to the Kuznet’s curve on inequality, “suggests that ecological 
damage worsens during early development as nations draw heavily upon their natural endowments” to 
achieve industrialization, peaks at later stages, but finally subsides because “exploitation of the natural 
environment becomes less central to the economy” (Ehrharfdt-Martinez et al. 2002). 
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4. ASIA-PACIFIC GROWTH PROSPECTS: A CONSOLIDATED NARRATIVE 
 
Growth continues beyond the short term 
 
The economic growth experience of Asia and the Pacific has triggered several questions as to 
the causes of the remarkable growth performance in some countries, the reasons for the 
differentiated patterns of growth within the region, and the possibility that the experience 
suggests alternative models of growth. The search for explanations of a growth that seems to 
be unprecedented in economic history has yielded several answers, but unfortunately, little 
agreement. However, a more fundamental question is whether or not this pattern of growth 
will continue in the midst of different challenges confronting not only the region but the rest 
of the world. 
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Figure 12. Growth of Asia-Pacific countries – 2008-2016 (source: OECD-FAO, 
2007) 
 
This section tries to assemble the different forecast scenarios developed by several agencies33 
in 2005 to 2007. Most of the forecasts dealt with specific countries only and lumped together 
as ‘other countries’ most developing countries in the region34 The forecasts ranged from short, 
medium to long term but agreed on three things however. 
 
First, growth of the Asia-Pacific region will continue (see Figure 12) and some of its major 
economies such as China and India will be increasingly important in the global economy. 
Second, while growth will continue, this will be at a rather slow pace compared to the 
previous years. Finally, while the region experiences several risks in its growth, what will 
                                                 
33  The economic projections in this section are taken from the OECD, IMF, ADB, Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) of the Economist, APEC, the Japan Center for Economic Research, Delloite 
Research, Deutsche Bank, Peterson Institute for International Economics, and the Economic Research 
Service of the USDA. These forecasts ranged from short, medium to long term. 
34 OECD for example, emphasizes on OECD countries only and major economies while the EIU 
tackles individual country projections of countries in Asia and Australasia excluding the Pacific islands.   
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have the most impact is the feared downturn scenario of the US economy, the region’s biggest 
importer and a significant trade ally to most of its countries. 
 
These regional growth forecast scenarios resonate the global growth outlook. OECD (2007) 
projects that global growth in the next ten years will be the strongest in decades as demand in 
countries continues to be strong because of the spread of technology and the globalization of 
commodity markets. Solid growth is foreseen in the European Union countries while 
Australia will experience a rebound in growth rates that will also spread across New Zealand. 
Japan is expected not to slide back to recession anymore (UNESCAP 2007) while the 
expected economic downturn in the US will likely happen but will not go beyond the short 
term (OECD 2007, EIU 2007). 
   
Trade in the OECD countries will continue to grow, albeit cautiously (ADB 2005). This in 
turn will benefit the Asia-Pacific region which is still predominantly export-oriented and as 
most countries will have a comparative advantage in the production of labor-intensive goods. 
In this global trade context, China and India (together with Brazil and Russia) will continue to 
become the key drivers of global economic growth due to rising investment, surging demand, 
and expanding trade prospects (OECD 2007). These two economies are the most dynamic in 
the region and will consequently provide growth leverage to their neighbors (Roland-Holst et 
al. 2005). China, for example, is the region’s major initial destination of other country’s 
exports (IMF 2007).  
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Figure 13. Export of goods and services, relative to GDP – 2004  
(source:  UNESCAP 2007) 
 
While economic growth of most countries in the region is expected in the next five to ten 
years, growth will nevertheless be not as phenomenal as in recent years. The world’s 
expansion will slow down lightly as demographic pressures become apparent in the developed 
economies and as momentum fades in some emerging markets (EIU 2007). Japan for example, 
will experience a lift from economic stagnation, but may not be able to sustain it as the ageing 
workforce will dampen further growth prospects.   
 
The apparent slowdown of import demand, more particularly from developed economies in 
the world, has significant repercussions in the region. In China, the decline in import demand 
and the imposition of administrative restrictions in some sectors which started in 2006 slowed 
down industrial production. Consequently, investment volume growth decreased as well (IMF 
2007). The capacity, however, of some countries to withstand the slowdown of external 
% 
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demand will be highly differentiated, depending on its dependence on external demand to 
further growth (see Figure 13).   
 
Singapore, South Korea, China, Malaysia, India, and to a lesser extent the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Indonesia, will be less vulnerable compared to Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh, not because exports are less significant to the growth of their economy, but 
because their main drivers of growth within the medium term are internal, rather than external 
factors. For example, Singapore’s engine of growth in the medium term will be private 
consumption and increased investments while both South Korea and Malaysia will rely on 
strong domestic demand and booming private consumption for growth to proceed. China and 
India, on the other hand, can compensate decreased trade with the developed countries by 
increased trade dynamism in the region. But Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan 
will be more vulnerable as their growth is driven by industrial expansion responding to 
Western demand for manufactures and services.   
 
Despite slowdown in world demand, the future growth prospects of Asia remain optimistic as 
the growth drivers in 2007-2011 are investment and private consumption, rather than exports 
(EIU 2007). Deutsche Bank (2005) reports that four of the identified five growth centers to 
2020 will come from the region. Among these are India (5.5% growth per annum), Malaysia 
(5.4%), China (5.2%), and Thailand (4.5%). These countries will grow as such due to strong 
population growth, rapid improvement in human capital, and increasing trade with other 
countries. On a related note, China and Vietnam are projected as two of the world’s ten fastest 
growers in 2008, at 10.1% and 8.1%, respectively (EIU 2007). 
    
The increased attractiveness of the region’s investment climate contributes to this dynamism. 
Many countries in Asia-Pacific made it to the top 50 countries in World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index led by Singapore, Japan, and South Korea (WEF 2007). The 
rankings do not only indicate ability of the countries to chart long-term growth prospects 
given the quality of their institutions and the effectiveness and efficiency of their factors of 
production, but also because of their preference as locations for investments.35 Singapore, for 
example, is leading the region’s financial service industry, and is second to Switzerland in 
global wealth management; it will continue to be so in the medium term or even beyond 
(Shameen 2007). Among countries of Emerging Asia, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and India are the region’s largest recipients of FDI for ten years up to 2004 (UNESCAP 2007). 
 
However, this trend also poses risks to other countries in the region. Countries like the 
Philippines, Myanmar, and Cambodia faced stiff competition in the past and will continue to 
do so with the emergence of China and India as investment destinations of global capital. 
While they have benefited as providers of commodities for production in the other countries, 
this will hardly be sustainable and the need to redefine their roles and competitive advantage 
for their individual growths to proceed is a major hurdle (Delloite Research 2007).   
 
Are growth fundamentals robust? 
 
Taking into account the country’s import structures, it can be said that most economies of 
Emerging Asia are still dependent on other economies for technology as imports of capital 
goods have continued to increase in recent years and comprise between 30-50% of annual 
imports (see http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx ). These capital goods are important 
conduits for transferring new technologies into the region. The growth of Thailand, Malaysia, 
China, and India is accompanied with a large influx of capital goods signaling continued 
heavy reliance on imported foreign technology. On a related note, FDI flows as a share of 
                                                 
35 On a related note, EIU (2007) projects that all Asia-Pacific countries included in its study except 
Bangladesh and Pakistan will have moderate to very good business climates in the medium term. 
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fixed capital formation are still significant in some countries (between 5-63%, the highest 
being Singapore), signifying external capital dependence. 
 
Having said this, it is also important to mention that economies were able to assimilate 
technology at a rapid pace and use them to boost their competitive advantage. Closer links 
between importing and exporting countries due to the surge of manufacture exports allowed 
the efficient transfer of technical knowledge and facilitated enhanced expertise in particular 
markets, in creating efficient copies of product samples, and in manufacturing quality niche 
products (Radelet et al. 1997). Significant steps were also undertaken by most economies in 
the region to become less reliant on foreign capital in the medium term (ADB 2007) and build 
their raw technological capacity to match foreign counterparts. 
 
 
 
Despite evident external dependence of the economies, there is however a strong indication of 
robust internal growth dynamics (see Box 9). The IMF (2007) reports that Asia’s growth is a 
combination of a rapid movement of labor and capital from low- to high-productivity sectors, 
high labor productivity, rapid physical and human capital accumulation, and increased trade 
openness. Even when an economy is open (and thus, facilitating external-trade dependence), 
without the other essential conditions, Asia would have not grown as fast as it was able to. 
 
Domestic demand also played an important role more particularly in the newly industrialized 
countries where investment and consumption remained strong (IMF 2007). In the past five 
years, increases in domestic demand were instrumental for the buoyant growth performance 
in most countries and will continue to do so as further increases in  
domestic demand are foreseen in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (IMF 2007). In 
India, consumer spending will be a very important source of growth in the next few years 
(Delloite Research 2007). 
 
 
Box 10. Asia Is Ready to Face a US Recession 
 
In the spring of 2001, the United States entered into a recession where investments, exports, and 
consumption declined. This consequently affected the economies of Asia and the Pacific through 
trade and investment channels. In Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and Hongkong and Taiwan 
provinces of China, exports declined between 5-15% compared to the prior year and most 
countries in the region suffered severe setbacks in foreign capital inflows especially after the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Only China and India, two large and relatively closed economies 
back then, remained immune from the downward pressures of the US recession which also affected 
the Euro area (UNCTAD 2002). 
 
Asia seemingly is facing another similar threat as an American recession is dominating fears in the 
stock markets globally. But is “decoupling”, a situation implying no impact on the Asia scenario 
logical? 
 
The Economist (23 January 2008) contends that decoupling is a misnomer, because a US recession 
will surely have impact on exports and profits of most exporting countries. Singapore, Hongkong, 
and Malaysia, will be vulnerable as their exports to the US is 20% or more of their GDPs, as 
compared to the 8% of China and 2% of India. Both Singapore and Malaysia initially experienced 
this trade effect as their exports last year declined by 11% and 16%, respectively. 
 
There is also more reason to be optimistic that Asia as a whole will be able to shore out recession 
ripple effects because of strong domestic demand (consumer spending and investment), large 
foreign-exchange reserves, surplus or balanced budgets, and more flexible governments. 
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Rapid Developers  
with Highest 
Investment Ratios 
(Average Domestic 
Investment as % of 
GDP, 1990-2005) 
 
China                38% 
Malaysia           35% 
South Korea     35% 
Singapore         32% 
Thailand           32% 
Rapid Developers  
with Highest 
Savings Ratios 
(Average Domestic 
Savings as % of 
GDP, 1990-2005) 
 
Singapore         47% 
China                44% 
South Korea     41% 
Malaysia           39% 
Thailand           36% 
The countries in the region are also more 
positioned to handle inflationary pressures 
caused by upward trend in prices of oil. In 
recent years, inflation was contained due 
to a combination of factors – efficient 
macro-economic management (e.g. 
proactive tightening of monetary policies), 
consistent growth performance, and high 
savings and investment ratios (UNESCAP 
2007) (Figure 14). China, for example, has 
increased savings in recent years due to 
internal factors – a relatively 
underdeveloped banking system, 
reduction in social safety nets due to 
privatization of state-owned enterprises 
and retention of earnings by private 
companies due to lack of access to credit 
(Delloite Research 2007). The effective 
channeling of these savings to appropriate 
physical capital investments in non-agricultural sectors led to growth in industry and services 
(Huang et al. 2006).   
 
While much debated, the role of high rates of savings and investment, both public (e.g. 
Kreickhaus 2002) and private (e.g. Liu and Xu 1996) cannot be ignored in accounting for the 
causes of high growth rates in the region. 36  The growth of the region’s economies is 
accompanied by impressive savings and investment rates, more notably in China, South 
Korea, Singapore, Thailand and even in Vietnam and Cambodia, though this drastically 
dropped during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. While investment rates of most countries 
(for which data exist) were not able to recover to their pre-crisis averages, this may be 
indicative of the move from capital-intensive to knowledge-intensive exports and a genesis of 
demographic transition towards an ageing population structure (IMF 2005).  
 
Several countries were also successful in shoring up official reserves (see Table 6) to cushion 
external shocks (APEC 2006; IMF 2007). For example, though high and volatile oil prices 
eroded significant portions of current account surpluses and foreign reserves of some 
countries, more particularly those characterized by high oil intensities, current account 
balances in most countries still subsisted and those with deficits were able to reduce them in 
the last five years. A combination of factors contributed to this resiliency – “strong exports, 
high capital inflows, and a benign global economic environment” (UNESCAP 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 The conventional wisdom is that higher savings rates will lead to higher investment, and thus 
economic growth. However, there is limited consensus in this argument. Some e.g. Krugman (1996), 
Young (1995), emphasize the role of savings and investment in the success of Asian economies, while 
others e.g. Chen (1997), Barro (1998) are skeptical. Caroll and Weil (1994) argued that growth causes 
savings and that savings do not cause growth but the World Bank (1993) maintains that there is a two-
way causality. Radelet et al. (1997) find some evidence for this “virtuous cycle” but conclude that one 
causality, growth, positively affecting savings, is stronger. This too is joined by a much recent paper by 
Baharumsha et al. (2002). 
Figure 14.  Countries with high savings and 
investment ratios in Asia 
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Table 6. Official reserves in selected Asian countries in USD billion dollars, end 
of period (source: CEIC Data Company, Ltd as cited in IMF 2007) 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 (latest) 
Industrial Asia     
   Japan 845 847 895 932 
   Australia 37 43 55 58 
   New Zealand 7 9 14 17 
NIEs     
   Hongkong 
SAR 
124 124 133 137 
   Korea, 
Republic of 
199 210 239 255 
   Singapore 113 116 136 148 
   Taiwan POC 242 253 266 261 
Emerging Asia     
   China 619 826 1073 1391 
   India 131 137 177 227 
   Indonesia  36 35 43 51 
   Malaysia 67 70 83 111 
   Philippines 15 18 23 30 
   Thailand  50 52 67 74 
   Vietnam 6 9 11 21 
 
In general, the Asia-Pacific economies will still chart growth in the next ten years, not only 
because economic optimism, though moderate, dominates future global growth scenarios but 
also because the region has increased its capacity to participate in this dynamism and 
withstand external economic shocks. The EIU (2007) projects that in the medium term, the 
region will account for nearly half of the world’s GDP (at 2000 PPP) and will continue to 
have favorable growth conditions – an increasing domestic demand, a triple growth of its 
gross investment from 2002 base figures, a vibrant external trade, and a healthy current 
account balance. An abrupt downturn in the economies of the region is unlikely in the 
medium term, but will increasingly be so in the long term if the significant risks indicated 
below will materialize and current signals of economic inefficiencies are not dealt with 
proactively. 
 
Risks and uncertainties confronting the region 
 
Different countries in the region will experience different risks and challenges as it continues 
to grow in the next five to ten years. However, there are significant risks that apply largely to 
a significant number of countries, highlighted below.37 
 
• Economic slowdown in OECD economies. A predominant risk common to all 
forecasts however, is the slowing down of external demand largely caused by the 
feared US downturn scenario which is currently showing early critical signs in the 
second half of 2007. The EIU (2007) projects that US growth will slow down due to 
corrections in the housing market but the risk that recession will occur will only be 
around 40% (see Box 11). OECD (2007) shares the same view that if indeed an 
economic downturn will happen, this will not last beyond the short term. In these 
contexts, Asia will remain vulnerable through trade channels. Not only will the US 
downturn scenario be a significant threat, but so will the economic slowdown of the 
EU and Japan as countries like Bangladesh export 30% of their goods to the Euro 
                                                 
37 Most of the analysis in risks and projections in this section is taken from the EIU country forecast 
reports and the ADB paper “Asian Development Outlook 2007: Growth Amid Change” (2007). 
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area and Indonesia’s largest export market is Japan. (Japan is also affected by the US 
slowdown as the US is its biggest trading partner.)   
 
 
 
• Oil price volatility and inflation. In most countries in the region, inflationary 
tendencies are strong, most of which are stroked by rising and volatile oil prices that 
affect not only the importing countries, but also the exporting ones. Strong inflation 
pressures are projected in India and in Pakistan as rising oil prices are considered the 
countries’ biggest economic threat. The price of oil relative to other commodities will 
also hurt the balance of trade of oil-dependent countries such as Bangladesh and the 
Philippines and if it persists will result in significant trade deficits, and even Japan 
will not be spared from this challenge as it will pose a significant threat to its already 
dwindling growth pattern. Even Indonesia, an oil-producing country will be affected 
by the volatility of the prices of oil as it is now a net importer due to a declining oil 
source caused by ageing oil fields and rapidly depreciating infrastructure. 
 
Inflation in some countries will be exacerbated further by other factors, like the 
agricultural stagnation in India causing increased food prices, trade deficit in 
Bangladesh depreciating the taka’s value, and a surge in foreign exchange reserves in 
China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 11. Differing Views: Is the US Heading Towards a Recession? 
 
“After a substantial slowing in 2007, annual average GDP growth will weaken further in 2008, as 
the housing downturn and the credit crunch take their toll on households and companies. In our 
main scenario, we expect growth to fall to 1.5% in 2008, but the risk of a recession is seen at 
40%.” 
     -Economic Intelligence Unit, January 2008 
 
“All in all, GDP growth should decline to well below potential in 2008, easing inflationary 
pressures but also causing the unemployment rate to temporarily rise above 5%. In 2009, an end to 
the decline in residential investment and the dissipation of the effects of the financial turmoil 
should lead to a renewed pick-up in economic activity.” 
     -OECD Economic Outlook, December 2007 
 
“Goldman Sachs on Wednesday joined a growing chorus of Wall Street investment banks that are 
forecasting the US downturn will turn into a recession.  Morgan Stanley was the first top 
investment house to forecast a recession, while long-time bear Merrill Lynch said following the 
latest jobs report that “recession is no longer a forecast but a present-day reality.” 
-Krishna Guha, reporting for the Financial Times, 10    
 January 2008 
 
“This is a classic overreaction," said David Kelly, market strategist at investment firm JPMorgan 
Funds in New York.  Markets, he noted, have a history of wild mood swings that often are dead 
wrong in what they purport to say about the economic outlook. 
-Tom Petruno, reporting for Los Angeles Times, 17 
January  
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Table 7. Analysis of prices of oil in the world market (source: UNDP 
2007)   
Year Baseline Supply shock Peak oil price Energy security 
2007 71 99 71 71 
2009 71 108 84 67 
2011 71 118 99 62 
Naphtha     
2007 64 90 64 64 
2009 64 98 76 60 
2011 64 108 90 55 
Kerosene     
2007 77 108 77 77 
2009 77 118 91 72 
2011 77 129 108 67 
HSD     
2007 73 102 73 73 
2009 73 111 86 68 
2011 73 122 102 63 
LPG/propane     
2007 159 214 159 159 
2009 159 231 184 150 
2011 159 250 214 141 
 
 
• Inter-country competition in the region. As earlier mentioned, countries in the region 
will compete with each other not only in terms of financial capital but also in the 
quality and destination of their major products. Thailand, for example will face stiff 
competition with China and Vietnam’s exports, with the recent appreciation of the 
baht against the US dollar. On the other hand, in enhancing its competitiveness as a 
destination of FDI relative to other countries, Singapore has started to cut tax 
corporate tax rates from 20% to 18%. These scenarios will continue to subsist in the 
long term as each country tries to solidify growth fundamentals and competitive 
advantage. 
• Political instability. The future growth of several countries will be affected not by 
purely economic pressures but by vulnerabilities to political shocks. ADB (2007) 
highlights in its report that political instability in the Pacific islands such as Fiji and 
Tonga, hurt not only economic performance but also bilateral relations with other 
countries. In Timor Leste, civil unrest is likely if oil and gas prices drop below 
forecast levels. Political uncertainties are also a significant domestic risk in Thailand 
and the Philippines as public agitation can worsen the already restrained investment 
and consumption condition. The persisting lawlessness and disorder in Papua New 
Guinea and the turbulent political scene in Sri Lanka and Pakistan will have a 
significant drawback to their growth scenarios when uncontained in the medium term. 
• Institutional deficiencies. Different countries are facing serious challenges that 
involve the performance of their institutions. In South Korea, the volatility of its 
property prices may hit hard the real estate market when government or economic 
shocks will cause a slump since most people who took on significant mortgage debts 
will end up bankrupt. In Bangladesh and Nepal, governance is a problem as most 
forecasts are based on the government’s ability to ensure economic stability, tax 
collection, foreign reserve management and pursue structural reforms which are 
currently problematic. Sri Lanka’s dependence on Forex-denominated debt to finance 
its fiscal deficits will make it very vulnerable to currency crisis while human capital 
deficiencies will plague Vietnam and Pakistan as a shortage of skilled workers is a 
problem to both countries. 
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There are other trends that will pose risks to specific economies in the region. Some countries 
are dependent on a particular growth driver and narrow economic base – power export for 
Bhutan, mining for Mongolia, tourism for Maldives – and this poses several problems. For 
example, power generation has a low labor elasticity and will affect growth of domestic 
demand, while decrease in tourism arrivals due to natural and political risks will automatically 
cause a drastic decline in employment rates. Pacific countries such as Cook Islands and 
Kiribati will be plagued by infrastructure problems while the Philippines, Bangladesh and 
Indonesia will be more vulnerable to natural disasters that would hamper their growth 
performance. 
 
However, as earlier stated, economic slowdown of the developed economies which are the 
region’s biggest trading patterns is the greatest threat to the projected growth scenario. 
Though Asia will be affected by these downturn scenarios, it is projected that the region will 
be better to withstand it than what happened in 2001 (see Box 9). More importantly however, 
this presents a significant opportunity and challenge for increased regional integration.  
 
The potential for intra-regional trade, beyond the current sub-regional trend enhanced by the 
proliferation of bilateral agreements, to contribute to further growth, more particularly to 
lower-income countries is currently underutilized and its capacity to decelerate the current 
global trade imbalance remains untapped. The feared slowdown in the demand for developed 
economies may be compensated by increased regional trade openness that is far below its 
potential (Roland-Holst et al. 2005). Also, the dwarfed capacity of small countries in trade 
negotiations with developed economies outside the region can be enlarged through increased 
regional integration (Gibbs and Wagle 2005). It is projected that a deeper and more inclusive 
Asian Free Trade Area “can achieve for its members larger benefits than that would arise 
from global trade liberalization along World Trade Organization lines” (Roland-Holst 2005). 
A facilitated Asian regional integration will promote domestic growth and absorption, lessen 
dependence on traditional export markets, and stimulate diversification of the economies 
within the region (ibid.). 
 
Nevertheless, the growth of the region in the medium term will continue on an impressive 
scale relative to the other regions in the world. The experience will be differentiated across 
countries, in the same way that historical growth performance is highly differentiated as well, 
and more particularly because the countries will be challenged by different risks.   
 
Across all forecast settings in the medium term, rapid growers are China, India, Vietnam and 
Sri Lanka (more than 6% per year) while impressive growth rates are also expected in 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Pakistan (4-5%). The advanced economies 
in the region will grow but at a rather slow pace (2-3%) with Japan experiencing growth at the 
slowest in the long term (<1%). Throughout the forecast period, the region will have an 
optimistic outlook though this may not translate into improved well-being of people and a 
significant reduction in inequality between and within countries. 
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Box 12. Dreadful Shocks or Pleasant Surprises? 
 
“………….the greatest changes are almost certainly still ahead of us. We can also be sure that the society of 2030 will be 
very different from that of today, and that it will bear little resemblance to that predicted by today’s top-selling futurists.” – 
Peter Drucker, 2001 
 
While most of the forecasts dealt with in this section paint robust growth dynamics for the Asian region as a whole despite 
a slowdown in global demand, it is very likely that as Drucker suggests, this may not materialize, maybe because of 
significant and drastic changes in the environment that the forecasts did not take into account. It is thus worthwhile to ask 
the question, will there be any probable events that would turn tables around against these forecasts? What alternative 
scenarios exist and how would this change the future prospects of the region? We turn to some of these answers below: 
 
A new Asia? 
The success of the Doha Round is uncertain but most analysts (Oxford Analytica, Forbes) point to a likelihood that the 
talks would fail, hurting badly the WTO and more importantly, global trade. Under this scenario, Asia, and particularly its 
big players such as China will become an increasing concern to the West so that a protectionist behavior surfaces, 
restricting trade, investment, knowledge, and technology flows (WEF, 2007).  
 
One reaction will be that Asia will regroup strength with China in the lead. A more inclusive regional trade agreement is 
forged, formalizing most FTAs that occur within the region, accentuating further the free movement of products, capital, 
and labor. In which case, economic growth persists. On the other hand, however, it is also likely that leaders of Asian 
countries are oblivious of regional trade prospects and anxiously forge more FTAs with western countries with which they 
had previous alliances. Stiff competition ensues between countries, with the far more competitive ones outstripping the 
chances of the others. In this case, while growth proceeds, it becomes more differentiated, causing significant social unrest, 
and hurting more the economic stability of the region and the growth potential of the low income countries. 
 
Oil price increase 
UNDP (2007) reports that most countries in the region are very vulnerable to increases in oil price and at the same time are 
dependent on oil to fuel economic growth. The WEF (2007) projects that a probable significant economic risk would be a 
permanent increase of US$10 per barrel in the price of oil that would slow down economic growth by an estimated 0.5%. 
A dreadful shock would be an increase in oil price beyond this range which UNDP considers no longer out of the question. 
 
Undoubtedly, significant increases in oil price will stroke further inflationary pressures in most countries, which already 
have registered between modest to high increases in inflation rates. Correspondingly, current account balances will be 
eroded due to high oil import bills. Some countries like China, may be able to offset this by continuing export booms, 
assuming that protectionism in global trade, as mentioned above, will not show its early signs. Countries in the Pacific 
Islands will be severely hurt by rising transport costs and could potentially lose out when oil supply comes short, as they 
are a low priority for oil exporters.   
 
Countries in the region have differentiated capacities to meet this challenge. Some will be more positioned to manage oil 
vulnerabilities and implement some of the UNDP suggested measures – managing oil price risks through subsidies and 
financial tools, enhancing oil supply, restraining oil demand, and diversifying fuel sources. Those who are unable to 
manage will undoubtedly lose out. In the extremes, this will cause closure of oil-intensive factories, massive 
unemployment, high increases in food prices and an overall downward economic performance. 
 
Reminiscing 1997 
Will it be likely that another financial crisis, reminiscent of the one that occurred in 1997, occur in the next ten years? 
 
There is a current fear that the turbulence in the US financial markets will spread to the Asian region (Morgan Stanley 
2007), as globalization of financial markets means that growth shocks can be transmitted through financial market 
linkages. The credit crunch in the US financial market is projected to be the main cause of deteriorating business 
conditions that would dampen profitability of firms. Consequently, losing funds will face redemption pressures and Asia 
will be a favorite dumping ground of equity holdings. A massive inflow of funds, already taking its toll for example, in an 
appreciating Indian rupee, will require efficient oversight and crisis prevention. But is Asia ready? 
 
The Institute for International Economics (2007) in its analysis showed that while Asian economic and financial policies 
and institutions have greatly improved since ten years ago, they remained “underdeveloped and untested”. The 
accumulation of financial assets and the lack of transparency and accountability in their management is a significant risk 
that if persistent will not preclude the occurrence of a financial crisis.  
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A still differentiated future 
 
Inequality between countries persists throughout the outlook period. While growth is high in 
the countries of emerging Asia, it will however, not be able to achieve pre-forecast GDP per 
capita of even the newly industrialized countries. In 2012, using EIU forecast figures, China 
will not even achieve 50% of Singapore’s GDP per capita in 2007, despite growing at a more 
rapid pace. In the same manner, India will not even achieve 30% of South Korea’s pre-
forecast figure over the same period. 
 
When the WB 2007 income classification of countries is used, several countries may move 
from one classification to the other, more particularly those that already had a significantly 
high GDP per capita in 2007. Thailand, for example, will move from a low middle income 
country to an upper middle income country in 202038 equivalent to the status of Malaysia in 
2007, while India moves from a low income country to a lower middle income country in the 
same year. However, most countries in developing Asia will remain low income countries 
like Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, and Pakistan, despite improvements in the per capita figures. 
 
Undoubtedly, the variations in economic performance, achievements, and economic prospects 
of the countries, are related to the differences in their initial conditions, factor endowments, 
quality of institutions, and economic policies among others. When this differentiation will 
subsist, the “dualism” or the “peripheralization” of some economies will have significant 
implications to the future of the region as a whole. With increased globalization on the 
horizon as evidenced by increased mobility not only of goods and services, but also of capital 
and labor, the countries in the region have to put their act together so as to avoid future 
economic shocks brought about by differences in economic achievements. Inequality between 
countries will be a threat to regional integration and can even threaten its political and 
economic stability. 
 
Table 7. Poverty projections in 2015 for selected Asian countries under the 
benchmark growth scenario, US$1 a day poverty index – 2000 PPP (source: 
ADB 2007) 
Country More Equal Distribution Less Equal Distribution 
 Headcount 
Ratio(%) 
Magnitude 
(‘000) 
Headcount Ratio 
(%) 
Magnitude 
(‘000) 
China 0.1% 1,841 2.6% 36,116
Mongolia 5.7% 175 9.1% 278
Bangladesh 3.6% 6,620 10.8% 19,652
India 6.8% 85,245 11.3% 140,949
Nepal 9.0% 2,895 17.9% 5,721
Pakistan 3.5% 7,177 15.6% 31,958
Sri Lanka 0.2% 45 0.3% 66
Cambodia 10.6% 1,954 12.3% 2,271
Indonesia 0.4% 902 1.6% 4,010
Lao PDR 2.4% 172 10.1% 737
Malaysia 0.0% 3 0.2% 59
Philippines 0.5% 482 6.9% 6,620
Thailand 0.0% 0 0.7% 466
Vietnam 0.1% 114 0.5% 474
 
On a related note, poverty in the developing countries of the region will still persist within the 
outlook period. While ADB (2007) projects that most of the countries in Asia will be able to 
achieve the goal of halving poverty in 2015, it will still be an unimpressive picture for the 
region by then. Even when assuming a high growth scenario with a more equal distribution, 
                                                 
38 Using ERS forecast figures of GDP per capita in USD, 2000 ppp. See Annexes for details. 
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there will still be roughly 85 million people living with less than a dollar a day (2000 PPP 
figures) in Asia-Pacific by then, largely concentrated in South Asia (see Table 7). 
 
While projections for inequality within countries are not available, the current trends indicate 
that inequality will somehow worsen in some of the region’s rapidly growing countries. In 
India, for example, the recent agricultural stagnation caused by low investment in agricultural 
infrastructure, lack of farmers’ access to credit, and unsustainable agricultural practices 
further caused rural poverty as it caused food prices to increase. The government plans to 
redistribute growth gains by undertaking proactive industrialization in several areas, but this 
too will cause massive worker displacement. In China, on the other hand, inequality between 
urban to rural marginal per capita incomes was 2.9: 1 in 2001 but increased to 3.3: 1 in 2006. 
Alarmed by this and its effect on the growth of private consumption, the country plans to 
undertake significant efforts in the future to rebalance the economy, part of which is the 
urban-rural inequality (ADB 2007). However, the effects of these interventions by the 
Chinese government still remain to be seen. 
 
Inequality within countries is a concern because it has been argued that inequality will 
adversely impact growth and development prospects of countries (Persson and Tabellini 1994; 
Ezcurra 2007). Inequality is also argued to increase pressures on redistribution and may even 
cause political instability in countries (ADB 2007). Further, pervasive inequality also is 
considered to lessen the poverty-reducing impact of economic growth. Hence, the region, 
more particularly the developing economies, is not only confronted by the challenge of 
sustaining its growth figures that are projected to be in a downturn in the long term (JCER 
2007) but it is also challenged by the need to ensure that while growth proceeds, this will be 
translated to improved living conditions of its people.   
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5. ECONOMIC GROWTH TO 2020: WHAT FUTURE FOR FORESTS? 
 
Growth scenarios to 2020 
 
Growth scenarios in the Asia-Pacific region will be highly differentiated so a categorization 
of the different scenarios is critical (Figure 15). It is important to acknowledge that the 
countries in the region will have different growth trajectories, shaped largely by the kind of 
decisions governments, businesses, the international community, private individuals and other 
agents make, given the conditions that the countries are in at present.   
 
Economic growth in the region in the next 12 years or so may be characterized by the pace of 
growth that will occur and how the benefits of this growth will affect people in general. In the 
base case scenario presented in the immediately preceding section, growth is assumed to be 
high in the short to medium term but will slightly decline after. However, the possibility that 
growth will be lower than expected and may even be less than modest is likely, given the 
volatile global economic condition triggered by the crisis in the US financial markets that is 
also feared to spread across the globe. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that growth will proceed 
in the region. What is uncertain is whether this growth will continue at the same fast pace as 
in the past ten years or slow down steeply in the immediate term. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Growth and distribution: probable economic 
scenarios in Asia-Pacific 
 
 
Whether slow or fast, the desirability of economic growth is both self-evident and obvious. 
But it is important to distinguish between a type of growth that benefits all people generally 
and that which favors only those who have opportunities to access its benefits. Thus, in some 
cases in the region, growth will be more equitable so its attendant effects on both poverty and 
inequality will be favorable, while in others, it will be less so, to the extent that economic 
growth will proceed without necessarily effecting significant changes in the condition of the 
poor and the well-being of the general population. 
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The links between growth, poverty, and inequality, however, are much debated. Dollar and 
Kraay (2004) argue that growth is good for the poor as it benefits them like all others in a 
given economy, contending further that it does not have any empirical correlation with 
inequality and is distribution neutral. Ravallion (2004) on the other hand, argues that 
economic growth can only benefit the poor when conditions are available for them to take 
advantage of the opportunities that growth provides, and that absence of correlation between 
growth and inequality does not at all signify absence of impact of one on the other. 
Summarizing several arguments on this, Bigsten and Levin (2004) contend that while growth 
indeed has a poverty-reducing effect, the strength of such an effect is largely dependent on 
what happens in the income distribution of a given country.  
 
This paper takes the view that growth is only desirable when it improves the lives of people 
especially those who are experiencing persistent poverty. As such, it is important that the 
benefits of growth are distributed equitably among people by creating conditions that would 
enhance the poor’s access to opportunities that economic growth provides. Thus, when 
growth is inequitable, it will likely polarize incomes of people more, and increase poverty 
incidence despite the recognition that growth has the normal tendency to reduce poverty. 
Countries then are faced with the big challenge of “growth with equity”, underscoring the 
current trends in development debate. 
 
The capacity of countries in the region to achieve high growth rates with improved income 
distribution is also differentiated. Thus, in 2020, some countries may be able to achieve high 
growth rates without necessarily affecting significant changes in income distribution 
(Scenario 2) while others are capable to achieve both growth and decreased inequality 
conditions (Scenario 4). Still, others may be faced by problems of low growth rates and 
widening inequality (Scenario 1) or have low growth rates but with considerable 
achievements in spreading growth benefits to their constituents (Scenario 3).  
 
What future for forests? 
 
Under these growth scenarios, how would forests look like in 2020? 
 
Forests for growth? 
 
The role of forests in a country’s economy is one of the persuasive factors that would 
determine its fate in the future. For example, several studies in developing countries have 
indicated that there is a positive correlation between deforestation and economic growth 
though this conclusion must be addressed with caution (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1998). A 
recent economic paper, however, provides a strong indication that “economic growth over a 
large cross-section of countries is generally accelerated by the clearance of forested areas” 
(Naidoo 2004) lending to the arguments that forests do play a role in a country’s pursuit for 
higher economic performance.   
 
Some countries may use forests to chart their growths further while others may conserve them 
for environmental and social reasons. In the former scenario forests face maximum risks and 
it may take only a few years for some of the region’s forest areas to be depleted. Some 
households may regard forests as a way to escape poverty while others revere them for their 
spiritual and esthetic value. Still, other private agents regard them as a way to gain more 
profits. Forests may be regarded as resources to extract without intentions to replenish. How 
countries, companies, and households regard forests, in so far as their role in advancing 
economic affluence will determine their behavior towards them and consequently, determine 
the forest’s future.   
 
This argument is set against the backdrop of resource finiteness and increasing demand, as 
populations of countries in the region will still be on an upward trend in the next ten to twenty 
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years (Basnyat, forthcoming). The boom of China, for example, may cause further depletion 
of forests in some countries in the region that will lose out to China’s competitive advantage 
in manufactures. In which case, their competitive advantage will rely on natural resource 
exports that will become very harmful to forests in the long run (Coxhead 2007). This has 
happened before (e.g. Japan importing timber requirements from its Southeast Asian 
neighbors) and will still likely happen again. Also, industries with adverse effects on forests 
like mining, when extensively used to heighten economic performance will surely impact 
forests greatly as growth occurs.   
 
In these situations, growth is not assured as income from forests is highly susceptible to rent 
capture and it is possible that forest loss occurs without necessarily effecting any 
improvements in growth performance. Also, improvements in living condition need not 
necessarily occur when benefits from trade are unevenly shared. The absence of appropriate 
institutions will further exacerbate these significant losses to the environment and economy, 
especially when countries are blinded by the mere pursuit of growth without regard to its 
attending effects on the environment. Given the pervasive weaknesses in governance in 
several countries in the region, it is very likely, that developments in forests and forestry will 
be determined more by market forces than by state regulations (Broadhead 2004). 
 
A backtrack to agriculture? 
 
With the increasing international prescriptions favoring investments in the rural countryside 
and in the revival of agriculture as a way to reduce poverty and inequality (see for example, 
WDR 2008), forests may be at risk. Investments in agricultural expansion will heighten 
competition for land use that would pose a significant threat to forests but on the other hand, 
will also move people away from relying on forests for livelihood. Capital infusion in the 
countryside may increase both alternative livelihood and agricultural expansion, the former 
beneficial, and the latter detrimental to forest condition.   
 
Investments in rural infrastructure, like roads, for example, are also argued to have 
jeopardized forest condition as greater access to forests in the countryside accelerated 
deforestation (e.g. Geist and Lambin 2001; Gorenflo et al. 2006). Rural roads are also argued 
to increase farm gate prices of agricultural outputs and decrease prices of inputs, thus 
improving farm profitability and promoting conversion of land to agriculture. On the positive 
side, however, they are argued to hasten poverty reduction as agricultural productivity will 
increase. 
 
Will this likely halt structural transformation? 
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      Figure 16. Agriculture’s share in future growth (source: EIU 2007) 
 
It is least likely that programmed interventions like this will largely cause a distortion in the 
movement of the economies towards increased reliance on services and industry as prime 
movers of growth, unless significant drawbacks in the development of the latter sectors will 
occur. Reliance on primary products will hardly be sustainable for countries and a reversal of 
current trends is hardly possible, given the economic conditions that are already created with 
increased industrialization. The EIU predicts that economies in the region (see Figure 16) will 
continue their transition as in most countries (where data are available.) 
               
However, while national aggregate figures may denote that an economic transition has indeed 
occurred, sub-national variations are still rampant. As such, while Figure 16 predicts the 
continuance of the trend of a declining share of agriculture in growth, this may not necessarily 
be true in all places within a country. This has significant implications in as much as in areas 
where the transition will occur negligibly due to differences in locational preferences of 
investors, forests may still face the risk of agricultural expansion. 
 
Improving rural conditions and enhancing agricultural productivity will most likely result in 
improved well-being of the rural poor. On the one hand, it may preclude them from further 
resource extraction, but will encourage clearing more land for farms as well. The primary 
challenge here is to ensure that this process of making the rural countryside more visible and 
economically viable will not have significant repercussions on forests and environmental 
condition. 
 
More growth, better distribution? 
 
In 2020, it is more likely that the region as a whole will experience high growth rates but not 
necessarily as steadfast as in the past ten years. But experiences of countries will also differ, 
as some will have higher growth rates than others. Conversely though, if the risks indicated in 
the preceding chapter materialize, then growth rates will be relatively low, and some countries 
too, will have lower growth rates than others.   
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Figure 17. Policy options: growth and distribution 
 
But whether growth is low or high, another important question is, will this growth be 
equitable? 
 
To predict how equitable39 economic growth will become is difficult as this outcome would 
entirely dependent on the kind of policies, not only economic, that countries in the region will 
take. In this case, three likely behaviors of countries can be visualized (see Figure 17). First, 
countries may focus on growth only, and assume that the economic growth achievements that 
will benefit the higher segment of the population will “trickle down” to the poor. Second, 
countries may focus on growth while at the same time exert substantial efforts to promote 
increased access of the lower segment of the population to the benefits made available 
through increased economic growth. Third, countries may opt to focus on redistribution first, 
thus making initial inequality conditions better to hasten growth processes to proceed, and 
then endeavor towards economic growth. 
 
These policy options have shown their indications in the experiences of different countries in 
the region in the past (see Box 13). The primary question then is if these options are available 
to countries now and in the future, will they be the kind of routes that countries would take?   
 
Redistribution, more particularly for land, which is often used as an indication of asset 
inequality, is not a likely immediate action for most countries, as the successful ones that 
happened in the region occurred under particular circumstances. In both South Korea and 
Taiwan, land reform occurred during foreign occupation while in Vietnam and China, land 
reform occurred under communist regimes.  But a certain degree of redistribution can take 
place, more particularly in the “realignment of the recipients of public expenditures and 
public investments” (ADB 2007).   
 
In line with the current discourse on poverty reduction, countries are challenged by the 
international community to reduce poverty by half in 2015. This has caused significant 
changes in government, non-governmental organizations and donor priorities in the different 
countries concerned. Significant investments have been made in the last ten years at providing 
basic social services such as health and education that can be considered as significant steps 
towards ensuring equitable access to growth opportunities within the region, under the 
“growth with equity” rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 It is important to emphasize equity, rather than equality. While this paper refers extensively to 
inequality, it must be understood as inequality in outcomes caused by differences in circumstances that 
give rise to inequality of opportunities (ADB 2007). Growth is equitable when it affords equal 
opportunities to people to benefit from it. This necessarily means the removal of circumstance-based 
inequalities. 
 Growth and Trickle Down 
Inclusive Growth 
Redistribution, then Growth 
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Box 13. Growth with Equity: What Record for Asia? 
Thailand 
Growth has been impressive in Thailand in the last four decades, but income distribution 
worsened, especially after the 1997 financial crisis. Inequality in non-farm earnings, 
inequality in non-farm profits to the detriment of small and medium farms, regional 
growth concentrations especially in the Bangkok area, contributed to the increasing trend 
in income inequality. The Thai government, on the other hand, did not make use of fiscal 
policy or other measures to redistribute income progressively and its expenditures on 
health, education, and other social services were insufficient to counter the regressive 
effects of its taxation system and tended to be urban-biased. Also, it did not have social 
policies that would cushion workers from economic fluctuations and its policies to 
increase access of people, especially from the rural area, to secondary schools came in 
only late (Jomo 2006). 
Bangladesh 
 
Growth of real GDP in Bangladesh grew substantially and consistently in the 1990s. 
Consequently, it resulted in net improvements in per capita real income that led to 
significant reductions in poverty incidence. However, while this is so, the pace of 
reduction was slower than expected, given the rates of economic and population growth. 
An important reason for the slow pace in the decrease of poverty reduction was the rise of 
inequality of income over time, largely attributable to inequitable land ownership, and the 
tendency for government spending and business investment to favor urban, rather than 
rural areas. Government spending on key services to enhance equity such as health, 
education, and rural infrastructure improved only in the late 90s, but was still minimal. 
For example, in 1997, the national budget for education and health was only 13% and 
9%, respectively, while rural roads constituted only 23% of the total transport sector 
budget. As of 2001, land redistribution was not considered a priority by the government. 
(Khondker and Chaudhury 2001) 
South 
Korea 
 
Agrarian reform carried out in South Korea after the Korean war laid the internal basis 
for subsequent development as it massively changed the structure of land tenure in the 
country and the underlying asset ownership base. Before the reform, 2.9% of the 
households owned 65% of the land, but after 1950, 59% of the households owned 65% of 
land. As an effect, there was a sharp increase in the income of the majority of farm 
households and a decline in income of the top 20% of the population. This led to 
achievements in reduced inequality in the years following. Not only did land reform 
reduce inequality, it also hastened growth in the country. It created a stable economic and 
political condition in the countryside, increased access to education in the rural areas to 
supply skilled labor to aid in the growth process, and expanded domestic market through 
increased demand – important preconditions for growth to take a stronger route (Putzel 
2000).  
 
Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2007) argued (using China and India as case points) that inequality 
occurs across subnational contexts (e.g. provinces and states), across sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
service, and industry), and across households (e.g. top 20% households versus lowest 20% in 
the income distribution). In the context of the region, ADB (2007) finds considerable 
evidence to the argument more particularly for countries such as Nepal, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam. On a wider dimension, inequality is borderless, as extreme inequalities between 
countries in the region occur, more particularly with heightened globalization. 
 
As such, growth with equity does not only imply distributing benefits to households, but also 
to contexts and sectors as well. Both ADB (2007) and World Bank (2007) for example 
suggest improving productivity in agriculture and in rural areas to respond to the challenge of 
poverty and inequality. UNDP (2003) on the other hand, called for greater investments to 
improve welfare in order to achieve significant reductions in poverty in 2015. Several analysts 
also contend that the way globalization is currently taking shape is to the detriment of 
developing countries (e.g. like the small island developing states and landlocked countries in 
the region) so they called for a more equitable playing field (Stiglitz 2002; Wade 2004). 
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Driven by both internal (e.g. civil society, voters) and external (e.g. international community) 
forces, countries will strive to improve living conditions through increased investments in 
education and health, better access to financial capital for the poor, and probably 
revitalization of rural economies. Also, they need to ensure that the benefits of economic 
growth will spread across regions and will help solve the country’s problems on inadequate 
labor absorption. Admittedly though, the achievement of different countries in this case will 
be differentiated, owing to differences in their political, economic, and socio-cultural base and 
the relative changes associated with increased globalization in trade, labor, and capital.   
 
Given this trend, the likely trajectory that countries would pursue would be that of inclusive 
growth, where countries pursue efforts for growth to proceed through various measures that 
would enhance their competitiveness in global trade, take advantage of each individual 
country’s buoyant domestic demand, improve productivity, balance macro-economic 
variables, and alleviate poverty and reduce inequality to achieve better growth performance.   
 
Growth and responsibility 
  
In the G840 Summit 2007 held in Heiligendamm, Germany, an influential document that 
outlined the commitments of the world’s eight leading industrial nations was entitled “Growth 
with Responsibility in the World Economy”. The document sets, among others, the G8’s 
commitment to financial stability, freedom of investment, promotion and protection of 
innovation, environmental health, transparency, and fighting corruption. Though only Japan is 
represented in that summit, the underlying principles of the document are critical concerns not 
only of the G8 but also of the countries in Asia-Pacific. 
 
Needless to say, the future of the region’s economy, as well as its forests, is determined by the 
decisions of the different agents within each country and in the region. The decisions made 
and implemented by individuals, households, local governments, non-governmental 
organizations, corporations, community associations, churches, national bureaucracies, and 
international organizations have myriad effects on the economic performance of countries, 
and on the health and status of forests. These decisions, whether done on the micro- or macro-
scales, are significant drivers of change, but those that have wider implications and have the 
capacity to affect the behavior of everyone else, are critical. 
 
A significant challenge in the region is to bridge the glaring gap between the macro and the 
micro, the economy and environment, and short- and long-term horizons. Decisions at the 
national level are often made without regard to their attendant effects on individuals and 
families while decisions of individuals are made without regard of their wider implication to 
the country’s economy and natural resources. Economic decisions are arrived at without 
considering their consequences on forests, while forest sector decisions are generated, 
ignoring their economic implications or the surrounding economic trends. Also, decisions to 
revert a trend in the short term are implemented, without considering their long-term impacts. 
These decisions need to be done responsibly, to ensure that equitable growth proceeds without 
compromising forest resources and the right of current and future generations to benefit from 
their services. 
 
For individuals to achieve economic affluence is desirable, but not when it happens at the 
expense of forests, and in depriving and endangering future generations. Growth is desirable, 
but not when it happens by cutting the last tree that stands. Growth should come with 
responsibility, not only for the good things that it brings, but also for avoiding, if not reducing, 
its harmful impacts on people, forests, and the environment. 
                                                 
40  G8 refers to the informal forum of the heads of state and government of the world’s leading 
industrial players – United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy 
and France. The European Commission is also represented in all meetings. 
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Annex 1.1. Map of countries covered by the study 
 
 
 
APFSOS II: Macro-economic trends and their impacts on forests and forestry 
 71
 
Annex 1.2. Countries in the Asia Pacific region, abbreviations used, and 
income classification 
Sub Region Country Abbreviation Income Classification 
South Asia Bangladesh BGD LIC 
 Bhutan BHT LIC 
 India IND LIC 
 Maldives MDV LMC 
 Nepal NPL LIC 
 Pakistan PAK LIC 
 Sri Lanka SRL LMC 
North Asia Korea, Democratic Republic DRK LIC 
 Japan JAP High Income OECD 
 Mongolia MGL LIC 
 The People’s Republic of 
China 
CHN LMC 
        - Hongkong, China HKG High Income, other 
(NIE) 
        - Taiwan Province TAI High Income, other 
(NIE) 
 Korea, Republic ROK High Income, OECD 
(NIE) 
South East Asia Brunei Darussalam BRD High Income, other 
 Cambodia CMB LIC 
 Indonesia IDN LMC 
 Malaysia MAL UMC 
 Myanmar MYN LIC 
 Lao, Peoples Democratic 
Republic 
LAO LIC 
 Philippines PHP LMC 
 Singapore SNG High Income, Other 
(NIE) 
 Thailand THA LMC 
 Timor Leste TML LIC 
 Vietnam VNM LIC 
Pacific Islands Australia AUS High Income, OECD 
(AIE) 
 Cook Islands CKI  
 Fiji FIJ LMC 
 Kiribati KIR LMC 
 Marshall Islands MSI LMC 
 Micronesia, Federated States MIC LMC 
 New Caledonia NCD  
 New Zealand NZL High Income, OECD 
(AIE) 
 Papua New Guinea PNG LIC 
 Samoa SAM UMC 
 Solomon Islands SLI LIC 
 Tonga TON LMC 
 Vanuatu VAN LMC 
Note: Income classification was based on World Bank ranking for FY 2007 based on GNI per capita in 
2005, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. LIC (Low income countries) – US$875 or less; 
LMC (lower middle income) – US$876-3,465; UMC (upper middle income) – US$3,466-10,275; and 
high income – US$10,276 or more. 
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 2: THE RAPIDLY CHANGING ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE OF THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION 
 
Annex 2.1. Real historical GDP in US billion dollars (2000 constant prices) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006   
Asia and the Pacific 7736.74 7995.14 7947.20 8159.40 8523.39 8698.64 8951.87 9297.30 9753.95 10191.79 10697.32
  North Asia 6293.73 6491.46 6438.97 6578.34 6873.00 6993.53 7179.30 7424.32 7774.34 8098.95 8475.99
    China 872.07 953.17 1027.50 1105.60 1198.50 1298.00 1416.10 1557.70 1715.00 1,893.3 2,096.4
    Hong Kong 145.34 152.76 145.12 150.05 165.36 166.12 169.34 174.67 188.90 202.64 215.65
    Japan 4569.33 4640.98 4541.27 4540.38 4669.01 4676.47 4688.62 4757.20 4886.46 4977.96 5087.97
  Korea, DR*   
    
Korea, 
Republic 441.96 462.52 430.82 471.69 511.71 531.35 568.38 585.99 613.70 639.46 671.39
    Taiwan 257.76 274.75 287.25 303.76 321.28 314.30 328.88 340.39 361.33 376.03 393.61
    Macau 6.42 6.40 6.11 5.92 6.20 6.33 6.98 7.33 7.78 8.30 9.71
    Mongolia 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.99 1.05 1.16 1.24 1.31
  Southeast Asia 558.58 583.36 541.37 562.69 598.96 609.20 636.08 667.51 710.89 750.78 793.08
    Indonesia 171.56 179.63 156.05 157.28 165.02 171.34 178.84 187.56 197.18 208.21 219.63
    Malaysia 78.62 84.38 78.17 82.97 90.32 90.61 94.55 99.67 106.79 112.30 118.42
    Philippines 66.25 69.69 69.28 71.64 75.91 77.25 80.59 83.48 88.55 92.95 98.01
    Thailand 127.09 125.34 112.17 117.16 122.73 125.39 132.05 141.34 150.06 156.76 164.59
    Vietnam 24.36 26.34 27.86 29.19 31.17 33.32 35.68 38.30 41.24 44.69 48.27
    Brunei 5.40 5.62 5.68 5.83 5.98 6.18 5.86 6.04 6.14 6.33 6.52
    
Burma 
Myanmar 8.18 8.74 9.07 10.04 10.97 9.88 10.26 10.20 11.59 13.01 13.93
    Cambodia 2.73 2.91 3.02 3.35 3.66 3.86 4.06 4.34 4.68 5.21 5.58
    Lao, PDR 1.35 1.45 1.51 1.62 1.74 1.84 1.94 2.06 2.19 2.34 2.51
    Singapore 73.03 79.25 78.57 83.61 91.48 89.55 92.24 94.51 102.46 108.97 115.62
  Timor Leste*   
  South Asia 492.03 512.46 540.27 574.96 599.15 626.59 651.46 702.28 749.54 810.00 880.24
    Bangladesh 36.95 38.94 40.97 42.97 45.52 47.93 50.04 52.67 55.97 58.98 62.80
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    India 370.93 387.54 410.74 440.03 457.37 480.93 500.61 543.69 581.22 630.22 689.17
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
    Maldives 0.46 0.51 0.55 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.75 0.83 0.78 0.82
    Pakistan 65.49 66.15 67.84 70.33 73.32 74.68 77.09 80.91 86.07 93.26 99.41
    Bhutan 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.67 0.74
    Nepal 4.57 4.81 4.96 5.18 5.49 5.80 5.76 5.94 6.15 6.29 6.42
    Sri Lanka 13.26 14.11 14.77 15.41 16.33 16.08 16.72 17.72 18.67 19.80 20.88
  The Pacific 392.40 407.86 426.58 443.41 452.27 469.32 485.04 503.20 519.19 532.06 548.01
    Australia 332.68 347.51 365.97 379.73 387.54 402.57 415.49 431.17 444.10 455.40 469.38
    New Zealand 47.52 48.21 48.45 50.96 52.13 53.94 56.44 58.47 61.04 62.23 63.75
  Cook Islands*   
    Fiji 1.62 1.60 1.63 1.78 1.65 1.70 1.77 1.82 1.90 1.93 1.97
    
French 
Polynesia 2.95 3.00 3.19 3.31 3.45 3.50 3.56 3.62 3.68 3.79 3.90
    
Kiribati and 
Tuvalu 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
    
Marshall 
Islands 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
    Micronesia 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23
    New Caledonia 2.64 2.69 2.60 2.63 2.68 2.87 3.07 3.29 3.52 3.62 3.73
    Palau 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
    
Papua New 
Guinea 3.63 3.49 3.35 3.61 3.42 3.34 3.31 3.40 3.49 3.59 3.72
    Samoa 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27
    
Solomon 
Islands 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.32
    Tonga 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18
    Vanuatu  0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Accessed October 28, 2007. 
* No data available for Korea, DPR, Timor Leste, and Cook Islands 
 
APFSOS II: Macro-economic trends and their impacts on forests and forestry 
 74
Annex 2.2. GDP growth rates 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006   
Asia and the Pacific 4.57 3.34 -0.60 2.67 4.46 2.06 2.91 3.86 4.91 4.49 4.96
  North Asia 4.22 3.14 -0.81 2.16 4.48 1.75 2.66 3.41 4.71 4.18 4.66
    China 10.00 9.30 7.80 7.60 8.40 8.30 9.10 10.00 10.10 10.40 10.72
    Hong Kong 4.30 5.10 -5.00 3.40 10.20 0.46 1.94 3.15 8.15 7.27 6.42
    Japan 2.82 1.57 -2.15 -0.02 2.83 0.16 0.26 1.46 2.72 1.87 2.21
  Korea, DR*   
    Korea, Republic 7.00 4.65 -6.85 9.49 8.49 3.84 6.97 3.10 4.73 4.20 4.99
    Taiwan 6.30 6.59 4.55 5.75 5.77 -2.17 4.64 3.50 6.15 4.07 4.68
    Macau -0.42 -0.28 -4.57 -3.04 4.62 2.21 10.13 5.00 6.21 6.66 17.07
    Mongolia 2.35 4.00 3.53 3.22 1.08 1.05 4.00 5.57 10.72 6.23 6.10
  Southeast Asia 7.39  4.43 -7.20 3.94 6.45 1.71 4.41 4.94 6.5 5.61 5.63
    Indonesia 7.64 4.70 -13.13 0.79 4.92 3.83 4.38 4.88 5.13 5.60 5.48
    Malaysia 10.00 7.32 -7.36 6.14 8.86 0.32 4.35 5.42 7.14 5.16 5.45
    Philippines 5.85 5.19 -0.58 3.40 5.97 1.76 4.34 3.58 6.07 4.97 5.45
    Thailand 5.90 -1.37 -10.51 4.45 4.75 2.17 5.32 7.03 6.17 4.46 4.99
    Vietnam 9.34 8.15 5.76 4.77 6.79 6.89 7.08 7.34 7.69 8.35 8.01
    Brunei 3.55 4.07 1.00 2.64 2.57 3.30 -5.14 3.12 1.70 3.10 2.90
    
Burma 
Myanmar 4.97 6.82 3.70 10.78 9.19 -9.89 3.80 -0.53 13.60 12.20 7.10
    Cambodia 4.97 6.82 3.70 10.78 9.19 5.49 5.25 7.05 7.68 11.37 7.17
    
Lao, People's 
Democratic 
Republic 6.76 7.04 3.97 7.31 7.31 5.77 5.92 5.85 6.34 7.00 7.18
    Singapore 8.15 8.51 -0.86 6.42 9.41 -2.10 3.00 2.46 8.41 6.35 6.10
  Timor Leste*   
  South Asia  6.72 4.15 5.43 6.42 4.21 4.58 3.97 7.80 6.73 8.07 8.67
    Bangladesh 4.62 5.39 5.23 4.87 5.94 5.27 4.42 5.26 6.27 5.38 6.48
    India 7.39 4.48 5.99 7.13 3.94 5.15 4.09 8.61 6.90 8.43 9.35
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  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
    Maldives 8.82 11.52 9.30 7.78 4.39 3.26 6.08 9.13 10.81 -5.53 5.40
    Pakistan 4.85 1.01 2.55 3.66 4.26 1.86 3.22 4.95 6.38 8.35 6.59
    Bhutan 5.49 7.78 7.07 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.68 6.70 4.90 8.00 9.50
    Nepal 5.34 5.26 2.94 4.48 6.12 5.50 -0.58 3.09 3.47 2.32 2.09
    Sri Lanka 3.80 6.41 4.70 4.30 6.00 -1.55 3.96 6.02 5.36 6.02 5.45
  The Pacific 3.73 3.94 4.59 3.95 2.00 3.77 3.35 3.74 3.18 2.48 3.00
    Australia 3.79 4.46 5.31 3.76 2.06 3.88 3.21 3.77 3.00 2.54 3.07
    New Zealand 3.53 1.45 0.51 5.17 2.29 3.48 4.63 3.60 4.40 1.95 2.44
  Cook Islands*   
    Fiji 3.09 -0.85 1.48 9.55 -7.22 2.70 4.30 3.00 4.10 1.50 2.20
    
French 
Polynesia 0.30 1.90 6.20 4.00 4.00 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 3.00 3.00
    
Kiribati and 
Tuvalu 2.97 5.70 12.60 9.50 -5.22 1.80 1.00 2.50 1.80 0.30 0.80
    Marshall Islands -15.86 -9.39 2.52 0.60 0.90 -1.30 4.00 2.00 1.50 3.00 3.00
    
Micronesia, 
Federated 
States of -3.23 -4.60 -2.84 0.24 3.16 0.30 1.10 5.10 -3.80 1.40 1.70
    New Caledonia 0.45 2.01 -3.20 0.90 2.10 7.01 7.01 7.01 7.01 3.00 3.00
    Palau 10.40 2.29 2.00 -5.40 3.19 4.50 1.10 1.50 2.00 3.00 3.00
    
Papua New 
Guinea 7.73 -3.90 -3.77 7.55 -5.21 -2.32 -0.84 2.67 2.50 3.00 3.70
    Samoa 7.27 0.81 2.39 2.57 1.75 6.23 1.21 -1.01 3.10 3.70 3.80
    
Solomon 
Islands 3.50 -1.40 1.80 -0.50 -11.49 -9.00 -2.40 5.60 5.50 4.80 4.70
    Tonga -0.37 0.06 2.45 3.06 2.57 1.80 2.10 2.90 4.25 2.30 2.10
    
Vanuatu New 
Hebrides 0.40 0.60 6.00 -2.51 18.10 -2.70 -4.90 2.40 3.00 3.10 3.00
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Accessed October 28, 2007 
*No data available for Korea, DPR, Timor Leste, and Cook Islands 
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Annex 2.3. GDP per capita, PPP (2003 conversion rates), USD 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Asia and the Pacific                       
  North Asia                       
    China 2518 2789 3057 3317 3588 3928 4335 4756 5265 5896 6572
    Hong Kong 21622 22393 23553 22117 23040 26045 26204 27349 28151 31165   
    Japan 23040 24151 24868 24806 25105 26220 26746 27051 27851 29251 30821
  Korea, DR   
    Korea, Republic 12521 13529 14283 13501 14849 16179 17030 19400 19187 20471 21868
    Taiwan                       
    Macau 19124 19088 19048 18110 17580 18582 19268         
    Mongolia 1375 1407 1473 1504 1562 1610 1642 1720 1836 2052 2250
  Southeast Asia                       
    Indonesia 2773 2991 3149 2807 2892 3028 3079 3200 3397 3601 3842
    Malaysia 7057 7710 8264 7557 8089 8927 8903 9183 9545 10276 10843
    Philippines 3436 3581 3748 3658 3753 4027 4020 4202 4368 4664 4920
    Thailand 5959 6397 6372 5757 5994 6279 6515 6909 7483 8090 8551
    Vietnam 1422 1563 1696 1789 1868 2014 2175 2347 2537 2774 3062
    Brunei                       
    Burma Myanmar                       
    Cambodia 1323 1396 1446 1511 1704 1859 1973 2081 2226 2423 2595
    
Lao, People's 
Democratic 
Republic                       
    Singapore 17969 19274 19917 19374 20809 23744 22937 24843 25788 28860 29921
  Timor Leste   
  South Asia                       
    Bangladesh 1220 1274 1334 1391 1396 1479 1623 1672 1743 1870 1997
    India 1836 1971 2056 2165 2311 2422 2565 2655 2883 3163 3486
    Maldives                       
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  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
    Pakistan 1648 1736 1749 1772 1819 1926 1968 2021 2096 2225 2403
    Bhutan                       
    Nepal 1088 1138 1189 1208 1250 1323 1404 1392 1435 1494 1529
    Sri Lanka 2636 2770 2947 3088 3236 3626 3591 3735 3939 4390 4569
  The Pacific                       
    Australia 20753 21602 26962 23783 24699 25417 26652 27674 28911 30332 31646
    New Zealand 16743 17574 17672 17526 18843 19615 20472 21381 22133 23932 22511
    Fiji 4478 4614 4621 4765 5127 4676 5011 5176 5423 5743 5958
  Cook Islands        
    French Polynesia 21062 21131 21497 22673 23500 24538           
    
Kiribati and 
Tuvalu                       
    Marshall Islands                       
    
Micronesia, 
Federated States 
of                       
    New Caledonia 22044 22107 22400 21564 21425 22140           
    Palau                       
    
Papua New 
Guinea 2281 2464 2345 2227 2374 2325 2289 2442 2687 2779 2801
    Samoa 4031 4190 4275 4356 4480 4861 5341 5612 5769 6027 6615
    Solomon Islands 2267 2396 2265 2272 2220 1862 1683 1671 1745 1787 1910
    Tonga 5603 5522 5369 5790 5816 6570 6889 7086 7434 7674 8046
    
Vanuatu New 
Hebrides 2991 3142 3108 3121 2981 3173 2984 2855 2966 3051 3276
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, UNESCAP 
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Annex 2.4. GDP per capita, current prices, USD 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
                            
  North Asia                       
    China 574.58 667.64 727.17 761.28 790.05 847.10 928.27 1009.09 1131.27 1315.30 1505.99 
    Hong Kong 23313.51 25302.35 27656.63 25820.66 24924.94 25426.43 24778.43 24062.90 23005.36 23803.93 24520.88 
    Japan 41496.57 36724.98 33563.68 30383.76 34299.27 36601.33 32113.44 30620.15 33124.87 35840.84 35593.26 
    Korea, Republic 11489.78 12281.45 11275.47 7485.11 9582.35 10937.74 10244.39 11571.56 12812.94 14282.68 16471.72 
    Taiwan                       
    Macau 16821.89 15792.47 15652.35 14294.34 13492.09 13757.02 13818.92 15122.19 17443.28 22657.25 23887.42 
    Mongolia 513.36 488.64 433.07 396.20 365.97 378.94 402.81 437.95 493.49 616.67 705.61 
  Southeast Asia                       
    Indonesia 1135.10 1259.21 1178.77 514.60 744.99 788.92 774.67 932.39 1092.30 1149.70 1262.56 
    Malaysia 4362.60 4827.16 4674.93 3286.60 3519.94 3927.43 3746.00 3974.24 4253.90 4752.79 5159.13 
    Philippines 1083.69 1185.71 1154.16 894.97 1025.08 990.29 922.04 975.97 987.97 1055.21 1175.77 
    Thailand 2880.19 3083.82 2530.13 1856.53 2015.26 1997.54 1862.98 2027.26 2263.38 2538.53 2749.41 
    Vietnam 283.42 331.59 355.64 355.46 369.63 396.24 409.77 433.55 482.35 550.07 630.99 
    Brunei 17685.66 17361.37 16557.91 12280.38 12944.77 12943.79 12231.28 12229.20 13349.97 15122.28 16799.67 
    Burma Myanmar 174.41 186.28 198.97 127.45 139.56 152.45 157.99 212.05 202.17 201.23 216.50 
    Cambodia 291.12 300.33 287.87 256.22 282.12 287.84 291.72 308.13 321.97 354.22 383.58 
    
Lao, People's 
Democratic 
Republic 379.33 390.26 355.19 255.26 282.10 328.38 324.56 330.82 376.28 433.71 484.77 
    Singapore 24131.98 25793.40 25889.21 21587.81 21056.19 23078.66 20897.00 21250.61 21974.13 25161.05 26996.61 
  South Asia                       
    Bangladesh 354.59 363.49 375.59 378.02 382.13 377.20 372.39 387.41 419.14 444.75 451.68 
    India 391.59 405.25 432.23 427.44 447.96 455.34 463.95 480.62 553.32 633.60 725.76 
    Maldives 1584.53 1736.45 1903.30 1965.84 2085.98 2151.29 2097.77 2096.18 2204.34 2344.75 2337.56 
    Pakistan 590.14 578.25 545.50 532.59 506.51 495.69 461.12 495.33 550.24 613.52 696.59 
    Bhutan 169.95 176.44 201.28 198.73 216.23 230.80 248.91 266.18 295.91 334.44 424.15 
APFSOS II: Macro-economic trends and their impacts on forests and forestry 
 79
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
    Nepal 194.81 197.54 212.31 195.46 209.88 218.49 219.71 212.78 230.21 252.97 273.19 
    Sri Lanka 708.06 756.56 810.33 833.42 819.69 842.26 801.00 834.10 912.01 988.86 1153.50 
  The Pacific                       
    Australia 21409.19 23514.42 23305.58 20511.00 22086.33 20955.79 19724.93 21797.06 27556.66 32877.25 35199.26 
    New Zealand 16754.02 18219.76 18023.95 14743.94 15339.93 13795.28 13608.82 15514.62 20488.41 24683.31 27208.69 
    Fiji 2591.73 2740.06 2664.57 2085.67 2419.75 2079.85 2030.07 2230.66 2770.00 3244.43 3536.40 
    French Polynesia 17375.75 17111.38 15176.16 15462.41 15217.87 13732.15 13416.19 14577.34 17983.63 20358.43 20997.63 
    Kiribati 515.67 550.58 522.70 541.63 583.45 526.18 509.91 535.44 601.43 680.14 721.12 
    Marshall Islands 2063.15 1897.83 1804.27 1872.41 1856.02 1895.76 1855.07 1895.71 1825.57 1811.14 1790.53 
    
Micronesia, 
Federated States 
of 1948.49 1916.35 1834.26 1881.60 1851.64 1997.58 2022.18 2067.05 2134.20 2081.33 2167.61 
    New Caledonia 18791.57 18253.61 16083.77 15987.01 15764.94 13948.76 13573.93 14431.38 17250.40 18598.12 18328.21 
    Palau 5474.02 6066.55 6199.38 6287.58 5970.38 6075.77 6193.76 5849.43 5909.38 6029.06 6150.05 
    
Papua New 
Guinea 1032.69 1071.23 998.41 744.59 715.89 729.20 640.27 620.01 737.22 855.06 905.33 
    Samoa 1190.86 1327.22 1421.62 1290.17 1307.42 1300.57 1338.82 1449.97 1748.18 2040.04 2195.92 
    Solomon Islands 1002.28 1077.57 1060.99 905.12 933.27 807.64 777.55 619.45 563.99 591.66 626.16 
    Tonga 1608.38 1823.23 1708.84 1538.42 1532.42 1481.39 1290.25 1404.37 1603.38 1850.16 2088.97 
    Tuvalu 1198.86 1263.73 1344.60 1292.58 1362.15 1204.01 1253.18 1421.42 1779.84 2208.77 2515.72 
    
Vanuatu New 
Hebrides 1411.60 1390.33 1419.65 1382.09 1337.47 1277.36 1199.24 1179.69 1358.93 1501.02 1555.66 
Source: UNESCAP 
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Annex 2.5. Population below poverty line (1USD a day, PPP), countries with available data 
 Population below I USD a Day (1993 PPP) Population below I USD a Day (1993 PPP) 
    In Millions Percentage Earliest Year  In Millions Percentage Latest Year 
North Asia   
  China            339.16  29.1% 1992            128.36  9.9% 2004
  Mongolia                0.30  13.3% 1995                0.27  10.8% 2002
Southeast Asia             
  Indonesia              32.55  17.4% 1993              16.48  7.8% 2002
  Malaysia                0.08  0.4% 1992                0.03  0.1% 1997
  Philippines              12.60  20.2% 1991              10.38  13.5% 2000
  Thailand                3.44  6.0% 1992                0.56  0.9% 2002
  Vietnam              10.09  14.6% 1992                0.48  0.6% 2004
  Cambodia                8.51  82.0% 1994                9.11  66.0% 2004
  Lao, PDR                0.81  18.6% 1992                1.51  27.4% 2002
South Asia             
  Bangladesh              37.75  33.7% 1992              54.12  41.3% 2000
  India            453.91  51.4% 1992            370.67  34.3% 2004
  Pakistan              17.71  13.5% 1999              13.73  9.0% 2004
  Nepal                7.04  34.4% 1995                6.52  24.1% 2004
  Sri Lanka                0.65  3.8% 1990                1.10  5.8% 2002
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Annex 2.6. Sectoral contribution to GDP, 1990 and 2005 comparative 
    1990 2005 Change (in actual values) Change (% of change) 
    Agriculture Service Industry Agriculture Service Industry Agriculture Service Industry Agriculture Service Industry 
North Asia                         
  China 27% 33% 41% 11% 29% 59% (0.15) (0.04) 0.18 (0.57) (0.12) 0.45  
  Hong Kong 0% 75% 24% 0% 91% 9% (0.00) 0.16 (0.15) (0.76) 0.21  (0.62) 
  Japan 2% 59% 38% 2% 66% 32% (0.01) 0.07 (0.06) (0.31) 0.12  (0.16) 
  Korea, DPR 27% 18% 55% 35% 25% 40% 0.07 0.07 (0.14) 0.27  0.37  (0.26) 
  Korea, Republic 9% 49% 42% 5% 48% 47% (0.04) (0.01) 0.06 (0.46) (0.02) 0.14  
  Taiwan                         
  Macau 0% 76% 24% 0% 87% 13% 0.00 0.11 (0.11)   0.15  (0.46) 
  Mongolia 15% 44% 41% 11% 53% 36% (0.04) 0.09 (0.05) (0.25) 0.20  (0.12) 
Southeast Asia                         
  Indonesia 19% 41% 39% 15% 42% 43% (0.05) 0.01 0.04 (0.24) 0.04  0.09  
  Malaysia 15% 43% 42% 7% 50% 43% (0.08) 0.07 0.02 (0.53) 0.15  0.04  
  Philippines 22% 44% 34% 19% 49% 32% (0.03) 0.05 (0.02) (0.14) 0.11  (0.06) 
  Thailand 14% 50% 36% 9% 46% 45% (0.05) (0.04) 0.09 (0.35) (0.08) 0.24  
  Vietnam 40% 37% 23% 26% 35% 40% (0.14) (0.02) 0.17 (0.36) (0.06) 0.71  
  Brunei 2% 44% 54% 3% 50% 47% 0.00 0.06 (0.06) 0.20  0.13  (0.12) 
  Burma Myanmar 57% 32% 11% 50% 33% 16% (0.07) 0.01 0.06 (0.12) 0.03  0.56  
  Cambodia 50% 38% 12% 36% 37% 27% (0.14) (0.01) 0.15 (0.27) (0.03) 1.28  
  
Lao, People's 
Democratic Republic 61% 24% 15% 45% 25% 30% (0.16) 0.01 0.15 (0.27) 0.06  1.05  
  Singapore 0% 67% 33% 0% 69% 31% (0.00) 0.02 (0.02) (0.67) 0.03  (0.05) 
South Asia                         
  Bangladesh 31% 48% 21% 25% 47% 28% (0.06) (0.01) 0.06 (0.20) (0.01) 0.30  
  India 32% 41% 28% 18% 54% 28% (0.13) 0.13 0.00 (0.42) 0.31  0.01  
  Maldives 18% 67% 15% 9% 74% 17% (0.09) 0.07 0.02 (0.49) 0.10  0.11  
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    1990 2005 Change (in actual values) Change (% of change) 
    Agriculture Service Industry Agriculture Service Industry Agriculture Service Industry Agriculture Service Industry 
  Pakistan 27% 48% 25% 23% 51% 27% (0.04) 0.03 0.01 (0.15) 0.05  0.06  
  Bhutan 43% 32% 25% 23% 37% 41% (0.20) 0.05 0.16 (0.47) 0.14  0.64  
  Nepal 51% 33% 16% 41% 39% 19% (0.09) 0.06 0.04 (0.18) 0.19  0.22  
  Sri Lanka 26% 45% 29% 16% 49% 35% (0.10) 0.04 0.05 (0.37) 0.09  0.18  
The Pacific                         
  Australia 4% 67% 29% 3% 72% 25% (0.01) 0.05 (0.04) (0.20) 0.07  (0.13) 
  New Zealand 7% 67% 27% 7% 68% 24% 0.00 0.01 (0.02) 0.07  0.02  (0.09) 
  Fiji 19% 61% 20% 13% 63% 24% (0.05) 0.02 0.04 (0.29) 0.03  0.18  
  French Polynesia 5% 80% 15% 3% 82% 14% (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) (0.24) 0.03  (0.06) 
  Kiribati 19% 74% 8% 8% 79% 14% (0.11) 0.05 0.06 (0.59) 0.06  0.80  
  Marshall Islands 14% 73% 13% 10% 71% 19% (0.04) (0.02) 0.06 (0.28) (0.03) 0.48  
  
Micronesia, Federated 
States of 18% 79% 4% 18% 79% 4% (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) 0.00  
  New Caledonia 2% 73% 25% 2% 73% 25% (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) (0.00) 0.01  
  Palau                         
  Papua New Guinea 30% 48% 31% 28% 34% 38% (0.02) (0.14) 0.07 (0.06) (0.29) 0.22  
  Samoa 21% 51% 29% 14% 60% 26% (0.07) 0.09 (0.03) (0.34) 0.18  (0.09) 
  Solomon Islands 46% 47% 8% 46% 47% 8% 0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00  0.00  (0.02) 
  Tonga 35% 50% 14% 26% 63% 11% (0.09) 0.13 (0.04) (0.26) 0.26  (0.25) 
  Tuvalu 26% 60% 15% 14% 71% 16% (0.12) 0.11 0.01 (0.46) 0.18  0.07  
  
Vanuatu New 
Hebrides 20% 66% 14% 16% 76% 8% (0.04) 0.10 (0.06) (0.19) 0.15  (0.41) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APFSOS II: Macro-economic trends and their impacts on forests and forestry 
 83
ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 3: LINKING MACRO-ECONOMIC TRENDS AND FORESTS 
 
Annex 3.1. Size of forest and agricultural area 
  
Total Land 
Area Forest Area Agricultural Area 
Asia and the 
Pacific   in 1000 ha 1990 2005 1990 2005 
North Asia             
  China 932748 157141 197290 531398 556328
  Japan 36450 24950 24868 5693 4692
  Korea, Republic 9873 6371 6265 2179 1881
  Korea, DPR 12041 8201 6187 2518 3050
  Mongolia 156650 11492 10252 125656 130460
Southeast Asia             
  Indonesia 181157 116567 88495 45083 47800
  Malaysia 32855 22376 20890 7224 7870
  Philippines 29817 10574 7162 11140 12200
  Thailand 51089 15965 14520 21383 18600
  Vietnam 31007 9363 12931 6726 9592
  Brunei 527 313 278 13 25
  Burma Myanmar 65755 39219 32222 10428 11268
  Cambodia 17652 12946 10447 4455 5356
  
Lao, People's Democratic 
Republic 23080 17314 16142 1660 1959
  Singapore 68.9 2.3 2.3 2 0.8
South Asia             
  Bangladesh 13017 882 871 10037 9011
  India 297319 63939 67701 181040 180180
  Maldives 30 0.9 0.9 9 14
  Pakistan 77088 2527 1902 25940 27070
  Bhutan 4700 3035 3195 432 592
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Total Land 
Area Forest Area Agricultural Area 
Asia and the 
Pacific   in 1000 ha 1990 2005 1990 2005 
  Nepal 14300 4817 3636 4153 4222
  Sri Lanka 6463 2350 1933 2339 2356
The Pacific             
  Australia 768230 167904 163678 464481 445149
  New Zealand 26771 7720 8309 17489 17269
  Fiji 1827 979 1000 410 460
  French Polynesia 366 105 105 43 45
  New Caledonia 1828 717 717 232 249
  Papua New Guinea 45286 31523 29437 907 1065
  Samoa 283 130 171 98 93
  Solomon Islands 2799 2768 2172 70 85
  Tonga 72 3.6 3.6 32 30
  Vanuatu New Hebrides 1219 439.5 439.5 140 147
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 4: ASIA-PACIFIC GROWTH PROSPECTS: A 
CONSOLIDATED NARRATIVE 
 
Annex 4.1. GDP growth forecasts, OECD and FAO, 2008-2016 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Bangladesh 6.5 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 
China 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.5 7.1 6.8 6.5 6.5 
India 7.2 6.9 6.7 6.4 6.1 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.3 
Indonesia 6.5 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.1 5.1 
Korea 4.6 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Malaysia 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0 
Pakistan 6.5 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 
Philippines 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.4 
Thaïland 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 
Vietnam 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.2 
Australia 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
New 
Zealand 2.0 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Japan 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Source:  OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2007-2016 
 
Annex 4.2. GDP growth forecasts, EIU, 2007-2012 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Japan 2.3 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.9 
South Korea 5 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 
Australia 4.1 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 
New Zealand 3.1 2.3 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.7 
Indonesia 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.7 
Malaysia 6 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.8 
Philippines 6.9 5 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.4 
Singapore 7.7 4.8 4.7 4.5 5.2 4.4 
Thailand 4.5 5 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.2 
Vietnam 8.4 8.3 8.3 7.9 7.7 7.7 
China 11.5 9.9 9.3 8.6 8.1 8.2 
Hongkong 6.1 4.8 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.4 
Taiwan 4.5 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.6 3.5 
Bangladesh 6.5 5.8 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.4 
India 7.9 7.7 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.9 
Pakistan 6.4 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.9 
Sri Lanka 6.1 4.6 5.4 5.9 6.2 6.2 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit – Country Forecasts 
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Annex 4.3. Growth rate projections (WB): 2007-2009 
 2007 2008 2009 
Japan 2.3 2.4 2.1
South Korea 4.9 5.1 5
Australia 2.3 2.7 2.7
New Zealand 2.3 2.7 2.7
Cambodia 9 6.8 6.5
Indonesia 6.3 6.5 6.4
Malaysia 5.6 5.8 5.7
Philippines 5.6 6 6
Singapore 4.9 5.1 5
Thailand 4.5 4.5 5
Vietnam 8 8 7.8
China 9.6 8.7 8.5
Bangladesh 6 6.1 6.4
India 8.4 7.8 7.5
Nepal 3 4.5 4.7
Pakistan 6.4 6.3 6.1
Sri Lanka 6 6.2 6.3
Fiji -2.5 2 2.5
Papua New 
Guinea 4 4 4
Vanuatu 2.4 2.4 2.5
Source: World Development Outlook  
 
Annex 4.4. Growth rate projections (JCER): 2006-2040 
 2006-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 
Japan 1.4 1 0.6
South Korea 2.4 1.5 1.4
Indonesia 3.1 3.7 3.2
Malaysia 4.7 3.7 2.8
Philippines 4.6 4.6 3.5
Singapore 3.8 1.8 1.2
Thailand 3.2 2.4 2.1
Vietnam 5 3.7 3.2
China 5.5 3.8 1.9
Hongkong 3.4 1.7 0.08
India 5 3.8 3.4
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research 
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Annex 4.5. GDP growth projections (ERS): 2007-2016 
    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
East Asia     
  China 9.18 9.12 8.00 7.28 7.26 7.26 7.27 7.29 7.32 7.36 
  Hong Kong 5.39 5.01 4.96 4.77 4.52 4.54 4.57 4.60 4.63 4.66 
  Japan 2.30 2.03 2.07 2.11 2.15 2.19 2.23 2.27 2.31 2.35 
  South Korea 4.87 4.90 4.83 4.66 4.50 4.53 4.56 4.58 4.60 4.63 
  Taiwan 3.18 3.40 3.53 3.65 3.68 3.71 3.74 3.78 3.81 3.84 
Other East 
Asia     
  Mongolia 4.61 4.72 4.43 4.36 4.29 4.22 4.15 4.08 4.01 3.96 
  Macau 8.44 6.81 4.90 4.16 3.79 3.59 3.43 3.38 3.37 3.37 
Southeast 
Asia     
  Indonesia 4.70 4.64 4.59 4.53 4.56 4.59 4.62 4.65 4.68 4.71 
  Malaysia 3.75 3.77 3.89 3.91 3.53 3.55 3.56 3.58 3.59 3.61 
  Philippines 2.46 2.49 2.53 2.57 2.61 2.64 2.67 2.71 2.74 2.77 
  Thailand 4.49 4.62 4.84 4.47 4.50 4.52 4.55 4.58 4.61 4.63 
  Vietnam 6.15 6.03 6.22 6.15 6.06 5.97 5.89 5.81 5.73 5.66 
Other 
Southeast 
Asia     
  Brunei 0.23 -0.51 -0.60 -0.65 -0.59 -0.45 -0.24 -0.03 0.10 0.14 
  Burma Myanmar 4.44 4.45 4.39 4.33 4.28 4.22 4.16 4.11 4.07 4.02 
  
Cambodia Kampuchea 
Khmer 4.16 4.96 4.38 4.31 4.22 4.12 4.03 3.95 3.89 3.83 
  Laos 3.53 3.86 4.41 6.40 4.50 3.65 3.61 3.58 3.54 3.51 
  Singapore 3.81 3.42 3.31 3.19 3.09 3.11 3.10 3.12 3.06 3.08 
South Asia     
  Bangladesh 3.69 3.59 3.49 3.25 3.25 3.26 3.27 3.28 3.29 3.30 
  India 5.58 5.31 5.34 5.27 5.30 5.33 5.35 5.38 5.40 5.43 
APFSOS II: Macro-economic trends and their impacts on forests and forestry 
 88
  Pakistan 3.94 3.43 2.82 2.10 2.08 2.04 1.84 1.87 1.92 2.13 
 
    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
  Bhutan 4.30 3.14 3.10 3.06 3.02 2.99 2.95 2.92 2.89 2.86 
  Nepal 1.04 1.97 2.88 2.87 2.86 2.84 2.84 2.83 2.83 2.82 
  Sri Lanka 4.25 4.22 4.13 4.13 4.12 4.11 4.10 4.09 4.08 4.07 
Oceania   1.81 1.95 2.17 2.20 2.18 2.20 2.22 2.24 2.27 2.29 
  Australia 2.24 2.37 2.59 2.61 2.62 2.64 2.65 2.67 2.68 2.70 
  New Zealand 1.62 1.89 2.15 2.15 1.87 1.86 1.90 1.95 1.99 2.01 
Other Oceania   1.18 1.17 1.37 1.56 1.55 1.56 1.57 1.59 1.61 1.62 
  Fiji 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 
  French Polynesia 1.50 1.54 1.57 1.61 1.64 1.66 1.69 1.72 1.75 1.78 
  
Kiribati & Tubalu Gilbert 
Islands -1.44 -1.44 -1.44 -1.45 -1.45 -1.44 -1.43 -1.42 -1.40 -1.39 
  Maldive Islands 4.97 2.78 2.74 2.70 2.67 2.63 2.60 2.57 2.54 2.51 
  Marshall Islands 0.73 0.79 0.85 0.91 0.97 1.05 1.13 1.21 1.28 1.34 
  
Micronesia, Federated 
States of -1.80 -1.67 -1.55 -1.44 -1.37 -1.36 -1.35 -1.35 -1.34 -1.33 
  New Caledonia 1.75 1.79 1.83 1.86 1.90 1.93 1.95 1.98 2.01 2.03 
  Palau 1.70 1.77 1.85 1.92 1.98 2.02 2.06 2.09 2.11 2.14 
  Papua New Guinea 1.65 1.63 1.60 1.58 1.55 1.52 1.50 1.47 1.45 1.42 
  Samoa 4.27 3.82 3.71 3.61 3.51 3.40 3.30 3.23 3.18 3.13 
  Solomon Islands 2.53 1.72 1.74 1.77 1.79 1.79 1.80 1.81 1.83 1.83 
  Tonga -0.83 0.42 0.57 0.74 0.80 0.73 0.67 0.61 0.56 0.52 
  Vanuatu New Hebrides 2.97 2.93 2.90 2.86 2.83 2.80 2.77 2.73 2.70 2.67 
Source: Economic Research Service 
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Annex 4.6. GDP per capita forecast, USD, PPP (ERS): 2007-2016 
    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
East Asia    
  China $1,881 $2,032 $2,180 $2,338 $2,508 $2,690 $2,886 $3,097 $3,325 $3,571 $3,836 $4,123 $4,433 
  Hong Kong $34,386 $36,090 $37,813 $39,520 $41,317 $43,206 $45,194 $47,288 $49,493 $51,817 $54,269 $56,856 $59,587 
  Japan $42,696 $43,581 $44,502 $45,460 $46,456 $47,493 $48,572 $49,693 $50,859 $52,070 $53,326 $54,630 $55,982 
  South Korea $15,145 $15,876 $16,616 $17,363 $18,150 $18,976 $19,846 $20,759 $21,719 $22,728 $23,788 $24,901 $26,071 
  Taiwan $17,463 $18,079 $18,739 $19,428 $20,149 $20,903 $21,693 $22,519 $23,384 $24,289 $25,235 $26,226 $27,263 
Other East Asia    
  Mongolia $3,168 $3,308 $3,453 $3,601 $3,753 $3,909 $4,068 $4,231 $4,399 $4,570 $4,747 $4,928 $5,115 
  Macau $3,973 $4,167 $4,341 $4,505 $4,667 $4,827 $4,990 $5,159 $5,332 $5,510 $5,695 $5,888 $6,087 
Southeast Asia    
  Indonesia $1,033 $1,081 $1,130 $1,181 $1,235 $1,292 $1,352 $1,416 $1,482 $1,553 $1,626 $1,704 $1,786 
  Malaysia $5,230 $5,434 $5,646 $5,845 $6,053 $6,268 $6,492 $6,725 $6,968 $7,222 $7,486 $7,761 $8,048 
  Philippines $1,146 $1,175 $1,205 $1,236 $1,269 $1,303 $1,338 $1,375 $1,413 $1,452 $1,493 $1,536 $1,580 
  Thailand $2,784 $2,919 $3,049 $3,186 $3,330 $3,482 $3,641 $3,809 $3,985 $4,171 $4,366 $4,571 $4,786 
  Vietnam $644 $684 $726 $770 $816 $864 $914 $966 $1,021 $1,078 $1,138 $1,200 $1,265 
  Brunei $17,129 $17,027 $16,916 $16,817 $16,742 $16,701 $16,695 $16,713 $16,737 $16,762 $16,790 $16,824 $16,863 
  
Burma 
Myanmar $323 $338 $352 $367 $383 $399 $415 $432 $449 $467 $486 $505 $524 
  Cambodia  $440 $459 $479 $499 $520 $541 $562 $584 $606 $629 $653 $677 $702 
  Laos $424 $442 $471 $492 $510 $528 $547 $566 $586 $607 $628 $649 $671 
  Singapore $27,633 $28,549 $29,459 $30,369 $31,313 $32,285 $33,293 $34,313 $35,371 $36,473 $37,623 $38,827 $40,089 
South Asia    
  Bangladesh $458 $474 $489 $505 $522 $539 $556 $575 $594 $613 $633 $654 $676 
  India $681 $717 $755 $795 $837 $882 $930 $980 $1,033 $1,089 $1,149 $1,212 $1,279 
  Pakistan $645 $663 $677 $691 $705 $718 $731 $745 $761 $778 $795 $813 $831 
Other South Asia    
  Bhutan $348 $358 $369 $380 $392 $403 $415 $427 $439 $452 $465 $477 $491 
  Nepal $234 $241 $248 $255 $262 $269 $277 $285 $293 $301 $309 $318 $327 
  Sri Lanka $1,095 $1,140 $1,187 $1,236 $1,287 $1,340 $1,394 $1,451 $1,510 $1,572 $1,635 $1,702 $1,770 
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    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Oceania    
  Australia $24,243 $24,869 $25,517 $26,186 $26,877 $27,591 $28,327 $29,088 $29,873 $30,684 $31,523 $32,390 $33,288 
  New Zealand $16,192 $16,540 $16,896 $17,211 $17,531 $17,864 $18,213 $18,576 $18,948 $19,324 $19,707 $20,096 $20,489 
Other Oceania    
  Fiji $2,216 $2,237 $2,258 $2,279 $2,299 $2,320 $2,341 $2,362 $2,383 $2,405 $2,426 $2,448 $2,469 
  
French 
Polynesia $14,646 $14,876 $15,115 $15,363 $15,619 $15,883 $16,156 $16,438 $16,730 $17,033 $17,346 $17,671 $18,009 
  
Kiribati & 
Tubalu Gilbert 
Islands $485 $478 $471 $464 $457 $451 $444 $438 $432 $426 $420 $414 $409 
  Maldive Islands $2,474 $2,542 $2,611 $2,680 $2,751 $2,822 $2,895 $2,968 $3,043 $3,119 $3,195 $3,273 $3,352 
  
Marshall 
Islands $1,859 $1,874 $1,891 $1,910 $1,930 $1,952 $1,975 $2,001 $2,027 $2,056 $2,085 $2,117 $2,149 
  
Micronesia, 
Federated 
States of $1,094 $1,077 $1,062 $1,047 $1,033 $1,019 $1,005 $992 $979 $966 $953 $941 $929 
  New Caledonia $17,627 $17,949 $18,284 $18,631 $18,990 $19,361 $19,744 $20,141 $20,551 $20,972 $21,407 $21,855 $22,317 
  Palau $6,788 $6,913 $7,046 $7,185 $7,331 $7,482 $7,638 $7,799 $7,966 $8,139 $8,317 $8,500 $8,689 
  
Papua New 
Guinea $678 $689 $700 $711 $722 $732 $743 $754 $765 $775 $786 $796 $807 
  Samoa $1,669 $1,731 $1,793 $1,856 $1,919 $1,983 $2,047 $2,112 $2,178 $2,245 $2,314 $2,384 $2,456 
  
Solomon 
Islands $613 $624 $635 $647 $658 $670 $682 $695 $707 $720 $733 $746 $760 
  Tonga $1,552 $1,561 $1,572 $1,585 $1,596 $1,607 $1,617 $1,626 $1,635 $1,643 $1,650 $1,658 $1,665 
  
Vanuatu New 
Hebrides $3,240 $3,334 $3,430 $3,527 $3,625 $3,726 $3,828 $3,931 $4,036 $4,143 $4,251 $4,361 $4,472 
Source: Economic Research Service  
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Annex 4.7. GDP per capita projections, USD, PPP2000 (EIU): 2007-2012 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Japan 33404 34619 65926 37343 38898 40549 
South Korea 24290 25380 27110 29040 31070 33300 
Australia 37720 39720 41490 43420 45390 47560 
New Zealand 27809 28971 30145 31336 32595 33905 
Indonesia 4320 4630 4960 5330 5710 6120 
Malaysia 12110 12870 13710 14610 15540 16550 
Philippines 5334 5624 5970 6362 6770 7191 
Singapore 41010 43300 45810 48410 51450 54920 
Thailand 9700 10330 10970 11650 12340 13100 
Vietnam 3640 3980 4360 4770 5200 5650 
China 8620 9630 10740 11910 13110 14440 
Hongkong 40230 42860 46180 49760 53520 57540 
Taiwan 34100 36277 38561 40719 43111 45566 
Bangladesh 1990 2120 2260 2420 2590 2770 
India 4290 4660 5050 5490 5970 6500 
Pakistan 2750 2920 3090 3290 3490 3720 
Sri Lanka 4774 5086 5470 5916 6407 6943 
Source:  Economic Intelligence Unit 
 
Annex 4.8 GDP per capita projections, USD, PPP2000 (JCER): 2006-2040 
 
2006-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 
Japan 34465 40851 47405
South Korea 32195 39847 45904
Indonesia 4597 6207 8154
Malaysia 15571 20085 24487
Philippines 6784 9468 12289
Singapore 41303 47253 53962
Thailand 11069 13443 16312
Vietnam 4763 6412 8575
China 12235 17832 22394
Hongkong 36723 39752 43942
India 5199 6822 8801
Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research 
 
 
 
 
